The political-opportunity structure of the Spanish anti-war movement (2002–2004) and its impact

Isis Sánchez Estellés

Abstract: This paper contributes to the study of social movements and their impact by approaching the topic through a discussion of the framework of political-opportunity structure. While there is a lack of research on the impact of movements, and few theories have yet been developed, there is a healthy debate on the elements that configure a movement's political-opportunity structure. This paper aims to contribute to these debates by first analysing the political opportunities of the anti-war movement in Spain (2002–2004) and, second, noting its impact in terms of the subsequent withdrawal of troops from Iraq after the elections in March 2004. After reviewing the literature on impact in social movement theory, the analysis then presents the elements of a movement's political-opportunity structure, explaining which elements should be considered variable and which stable. The paper closes by exploring which of these elements explains most powerfully the policy impact of movements.

Introduction

This paper analyses how the Spanish anti-war movement achieved its goal of troop withdrawal from Iraq in March 2004. In November 2002, agreement was reached at the European Social Forum to launch a campaign against the war in Iraq, to coordinate an international anti-war movement, and to consult on possible protest dates such as February 15th or March 20th 2003. There followed a moment of climax in Spain between February 15th and 20th, when more than 5 million people demonstrated in several Spanish cities. The protests continued during the spring, summer and autumn and even into the beginning of 2004, although their intensity diminished.

On March 11th 2004, however, there was a terrorist attack by Al Qaeda in Spain on the Atocha trains. The following day prime minister José María Aznar called for a demonstration defending Spain against the terrorism of ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, the nationalist-terrorist organization of the Basque Country), but his calls backfired. On March 13th, part of the citizenship spontaneously demonstrated against Aznar and his centre-right party, the Popular

Party (PP) in front of its offices. The next day, elections were held and the centre-left Socialist Workers Party of Spain (PSOE) won. The new prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, withdrew the troops from Iraq. This decision to withdraw the troops was considered a success for the anti-war movement. So what were the conditions for such a success? Is there any theory that can account for this process?

In Schumaker's typology (1975), this success or impact can be understood as 'policy responsiveness'; in Kitschelt's (1986) typology, it can be understood as a 'substantive' impact; in Kriesi's (1991), a 'proactive' impact; and in Giugni's (1999) and Rochon and Mazmanian's (1993), a 'policy change' impact. All of these types thus refer only to changes in policy. Much research has focused on policy outcomes, because it is easier to measure such an impact than assess wider social or cultural impacts (Giugni, 1999). In particular much research has focused on the policy impact of movements by relating their actions to changes in legislation, or to some other manifest indication of policy change (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan, 1992; Banaszak, 1996; Burstein, 1985, 1979; Tarrow, 1993; Kitschelt, 1986).

By contrast Gamson (1990) suggests two critical aspects of a movement's success: the acceptance of a group as a valid representative of a legitimate set of interests by its antagonists; and the same group winning advantages for its benefit. This categorization is generally useful, but omits something critical: the political process itself that occurs between a movement's initial challenge and a subsequent substantive political change (Burstein, Einwohner and Hollander, 1995). It is here, as is discussed in what follows, where the concept of the political-opportunity structure can play a role, explaining the process of how the political environment provides the conditions for a movement to attain its goals.

Theories of social movement impact

The impact of social movements has still not been theorized systematically (Giugni, 1999). Movements, and their impacts, have long been the subject of study, but the theoretical focus of this work has tended to be somewhat narrow (Amenta, Dunleavy and Bernstein, 1994; Banaszak, 1996; Giugni *et al.*, 1999). Evaluating what is to be considered to be an outcome is also an open debate (Amenta and Young, 1999). What stand out are two debates within the study of the impact of social movements: the disruption/moderation debate (discussion about the (un)successful use of violence) and the internal/external debate (Giugni, 1999). Both issues are addressed by Gamson (1990) in *The Strategy of Social Protest*. In this paper, I focus my attention on the internal/external debate, because the anti-war movement in Spain considered itself to be pacifist and did use violence in its tactics.

The internal/external debate relates to whether variables are endogenous or exogenous to the movement and which better account for its success. More

specifically, the debate involves disagreement between those authors who argue that social movements are capable of achieving their aims independent of external support, and those who see external support as a precondition for success. The former perspective is identified with the resource mobilization theory, which has been translated into a perspective that stresses the importance of 'bargaining' for the movement's impact (see Burstein, Einwohner and Holander, 1995). The latter perspective is identified with political-process theory and it is this perspective I propose to analyse alongside the theoretical elements associated with political-opportunity structures.

A number of studies stress the importance of the political environment and the context for the success or otherwise of a social movement (Goldstone, 1980; Kitschelt, 1986; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; McAdam, 1982; Schumaker, 1975). Kitschelt (1986) in his comparison of anti-nuclear movements in four Western democracies argues that a movement's impact strongly depends on the existing political-opportunity structure. Similarly, Tarrow (1998) explains the crucial role of political opportunities in shaping the long-term effects on the individual, institutional and cultural levels. Piven and Cloward (1979), in their research on the unemployed workers' movement, the industrial workers' movement, the civil rights movement and the welfare rights movement, demonstrate that the impact of protest movements is shaped by the prevailing social structure, specifically the features of institutional life that shape the opportunities for action, model its forms and limit its impact.

There is, then, an ongoing interest in which factors are most important in affecting the impact of movements (Giugni, 1998). Amenta and his colleagues (1992, 1994, 1996) provide the most recent systematic attempt to understand the determinants of a movement's impact. They present a 'political mediation model', whereby a movement's impact typically requires mediation by supportive actors across various political institutions. In particular, they look at the presence of sympathetic regimes and state bureaucracies that benefit from protest outcomes, in addition to the importance of strong organization within movements. For example, Amenta *et al.* (1996) suggest that disruptive tactics may be less important in a strongly sympathetic political context, but note that the same context may require strong organization. Thus, the importance of the factors does not rest solely on the strength of their association with a particular outcome but, in a more complex way, how they interact with each other in relation to the type of impact (Cress and Snow, 2000).

This point leads to an important idea: that the factors associated with a movement's impact may vary in their importance depending on the type of impact. As mentioned already, there are several typologies of impact, including those suggested by Schumaker (1975), Kitschelt (1986), Kriesi (1995), Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) and Giugni (1999). In general, the types of impact depend on: whether the impacts are in the political arena or in other arenas including the social and cultural; whether the impact is external or internal (i.e. inside or outside the movement); and whether the impact affects the fundamental relationship between political elites and the people, or only changes policy.

Methodology

I follow Miles and Huberman's (1994) 'transcendental realism' as a means of qualitative analysis with three interrelated elements: the reduction of the data, the treatment of the data and the development of conclusions. It involves the processes of coding, taking notes and developing explanations.

My methodology includes analysis of data with a constructivist approach (Silverman, 2006) of 45 open standardized interviews (Patton, 1990) with experts, more specifically with activists in the anti-war movement and with politicians of the two most important left-wing parties in Spain, the United Left (IU) (the third most important party in votes) and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE); also the main trade unions, the Workers Commission (CCOO) and the Workers General Union (UGT). The constructivist perspective focuses on documenting the way in which accounts are part of the world that they describe.

I also analysed news from two main newspapers in Spain, *El Pais* and *El Mundo*, particularly their coverage of the anti-war movement, and documented analysis on the main organizations (Madrid Social Forum, Stop the War in Catalonia, Culture Platform against the war, Committee of Solidarity with the Arab Cause). I coded and analysed the data using MaxQDA software. I focus on these two main newspapers with opposing ideologies, one from the right (*El Mundo*), and one from the left (*El Pais*), because I am interested in how they deal with topics related to the war.

This paper adopts a qualitative methodology to complement the statistical analyses that other authors have undertaken relating the anti-war movement in Spain with electoral turnout and the mobilizations of left-leaning abstainers following the 2004 terrorist attacks (see Lago and Montero, 2005; Montero and Lago, 2007; Sanz and Sierra, 2005; Font and Mateos, 2007; Barreiro, 2004). The aim is to discover the sociological routes that helped the movement make an impact though a major change in foreign policy.

Political-opportunity structure and the impact of social movements

Tarrow (1994) outlines the problems of assessing the impact of social movements since their influence is often indirect and mediated by conventional political processes (Andrews, 1997). Identifying a direct causal relationship is often extremely difficult. However, the elements of political-process theory can give an account about the opportunities and constraints for a social movement. In fact, the political-process approach appears the most appropriate for providing an account of the reasons and conditions for when movements achieve a policy change. The wisdom, creativity and outcomes of activists' choices are perhaps only understood and evaluated by looking at the political context and the rules of the games in which the choices are made (Sawyers and Meyer, 1999).

The most suitable concept for analysing this process is the political-opportunity structure. It has been used in previous studies of social movements as a key explanatory variable in relation to two dependent variables: the timing of collective action and the outcomes of movement activity (McAdam, 1996).¹ It is the latter that is of concern in this study. High mobilization does not necessarily lead to impact if the political-opportunity structure is not open to change. In contrast, lower mobilization may have an important impact, owing to properties of the political-opportunity structure (Kitschelt, 1986; Kolb, 2007). In this paper, I therefore analyse those elements of the political-opportunity structure that are more suitable to explaining the impact of social movements, in particular policy change.

To start with the definition of political-opportunity structure, Tarrow defines this as '*dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure*' (Tarrow, 1994: 85).² Tarrow points out that this is a dynamic set of variables that varies from time to time and from place to place (Tarrow, 1994).³ Different authors have conceptualized this set of variables in different ways (see McAdam, 1996), such as Brockett (1991), Kriesi *et al.* (1992, 1995), Rucht (1996) and Tarrow (1994).

Basically, all four authors have distinguished the formal institutional or legal structure of a given political system from the more informal structure of power relations (McAdam, 1996: 26). Meyer and Minkoff (2004) have further noted the difficulty of determining which elements contribute to the emergence, development and influence of protest movements. They also distinguish between the more stable elements in the socio-political structure and the more unstable elements. The present paper attempts to clarify which elements can be considered more stable in the political structure or more variable, and also clarify which elements have best explained the attainment of the Spanish anti-war movement's goal.

Starting with the variable elements, there are four which can be readily identified: 1) the opening up of political access, 2) shifts in ruling alignments, 3) the availability of influential allies, 4) cleavages within and amongst elites. As explained below, I add to these number 5), repression and facilitation. A brief explanation of each element now follows.

1) The opening up of political access

Authors such as McAdam (1996) have named this element *the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system*. McAdam claims (1996) that this first dimension emphasizes the importance attributed to the formal legal and institutional structure of a given polity by all of the authors.

Expanding access is expressed more clearly through elections, in the case of democratic regimes. However, I consider another element which can explain the possibility of access to participation, which is in my explanation of the

emergence and impact of the anti-war movement. *It is the consequences of the government responses* to the 3/11 attacks in Spain. When there is a terrorist attack in a country, it creates a new environment in which government's response, and the citizens' reaction to that response can be crucial for a movement's impact. The result can be considered as an issue-specific opportunity ie not translatable across social movements (Meyer and Minkoff, 1993, 2004).

2) Unstable alignments

Changes in government and opposition parties, especially when they are based in new coalitions, create uncertainty among supporters, and may lead elites to compete for support outside the polity (Tarrow, 1994). This element of the opportunity structure is more likely to have a causal effect on the emergence and development of a movement than the movement's own subsequent impact (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004).

3) Influential allies

Political parties are important allies for dissidents in representative systems. Generally speaking, the parties of the left are more favourable to the dissidents than the moderate or conservative parties (Tarrow, 2004). If the Social Democrats in particular are in opposition, they profit from the challenges new social movements direct at the government. This is especially true of moderate challenges that are considered legitimate by a large part of the electorate. By extension, Maguire (1995) claims that if a party is a potential party of government it could offer a successful movement an opportunity to realize its goals. This element is likely to be crucial for a movement's impact on policy.

4) Divided elites

Conflicts within and amongst elites encourage unrepresented groups to engage in collective action. Tarrow argues that elite-level divisions encourage non-represented groups, as well as those elites who are out of power, to seize the 'role of the tribunes of the people' (Tarrow, 2004: 119). This element of the political-opportunity structure encourages a process of legitimisation by the movement that spreads its demands through the population.

5) Repression and facilitation by the state

While Tarrow (2004) places this in the variable elements, he then talks about it again in the stable elements. I am going to place this firmly in the variable category as a fifth element as it changes depending on who is in government.

Repression and facilitation are better seen as two separate continua than as polar opposites, characteristic of different types of states. (Tilly, 1978).⁴ I base my analysis of repression/facilitation on the interpretive framework of Donatella della Porta (1996), which includes the following dimensions: a) 'repressive' versus 'tolerant', according to the range of prohibited behaviours; b) 'selective'

versus 'diffuse', according to the range of groups subject to repression; c) 'preventive' versus 'reactive', according to the timing of police intervention; d) 'hard' versus 'soft' according to the degree of force involved ; and c) 'dirty' versus 'lawful', according to the degree to which respect for legal and democratic procedures is emphasized. For example, a softer style of policing favours the diffusion of protest (Della Porta, 1996). This diffusion of protest attracts people to the cause.

Stable elements in political-opportunity structures

The aspects mentioned above can be considered as the dynamic aspects of political-opportunity structures, but there are other elements that can be considered as stable. Authors such as Peter Eisinger, William Gamson, David Meyer, Hanspeter Kriesi and Herbert Kitschelt have argued about the stable elements of the political-opportunity structure.

The structure of the state is a useful dimension in predicting whether and where the movements will find opportunities to engage in collective action. As states deal differently with strong and weak contenders, they show a different face in different sectors and vary their strength over time. Consequently, it is more useful to specify particular aspects of an institutional structure that relate directly to movements than to situate the state as a predictor of collective action⁵ (Tarrow, 2004).

For this reason, I prefer to use more operational and concrete concepts. Where I am trying to explain the more stable elements, I prefer to use two concepts of Kitschelt (1986): political input structures and political output structures. Political input structures refer to how some elements of the political system are more open or closed to receiving and absorbing demands. Political output structures refer to how the system implements policies.

According to Kitschelt (1986) there are at least four factors that determine the openness of the political system to new demands. Firstly, the number of political parties that effectively articulate different demands in electoral politics influences openness (Kitschelt, 1986). Where there are large numbers of parties, social movements will be more likely to find allies within the system (Kriesi, 1995). In addition, Kriesi (1995) remarks that the *electoral system* plays a role. Proportional representation allows easier access for challengers than plurality or majority methods. New social movements, and in fact I would extend this to all kinds of movements, are more likely to find allies within the party system in proportional representation systems (Kriesi, 1995).

The second element in the input structures of Kitschelt is the independence of the legislatures. Openness increases with the capacity of the legislatures to develop and control policies independently of the executive (Kitschelt, 1986).

The third element is patterns of intermediation between the interest groups and the executive branch. Where fluid links are dominant, access for new interests are facilitated.

The fourth element refers to the mechanism of aggregation of demands. In fact, demands must actually find their way '*into the processes of forming policy compromises and consensus*' (Kitschelt, 1986: 63).⁶

To these stable elements, I also add the *structure of mass media*. In fact the more open the structure of the mass media is in a country, the more visible the movement is for the people (more coverage) and the more likely it is that the social movement can achieve its political objectives. '*The mass media play a crucial role in defining for movement actors whether they are taken seriously as agents of possible change*' (Gamson and Meyer, 1996).

The importance of the media

The media spotlight validates the movement as an important player. This suggests that the opening and closing of media access and attention is an important element in determining the political opportunities for movements (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). Media norms and practices and the broader political economy in which they operate affect the opportunities and constraints under which movements operate. Key organizations in the media system confer the standing of actors. They put them into the public sphere, suggest other media, refer to elites and publicly explain who the serious players are (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). By putting them into the public sphere and pointing out who the serious players are, the mass media help to legitimate a social movement. This process can shape the public preferences (Burstein, 1985) and this can lead to a change in voting behaviour.

Gamson and Meyer (1996) distinguish between a stable element of the mass media, which they call organizational and political economy of the mass media, and the other more volatile one which they call mass media access. I consider this as a stable element, as I am going to demonstrate certain aspects of how the media works in the country independently of who is in power. The structure of the mass media is interrelated with the rules of the political system.⁷

Analysis of the Spanish anti-war movement

In this section, I analyse the political-opportunity structure of the Spanish anti-war movement in order to identify those elements that best explain its policy impact. Meyer and Minkoff (2004) claim that movement-related policy outcomes are unequivocally determined by structural elements in the polity. The case of the Spanish anti-war movement suggests otherwise; instead, my reading of events supports Rucht's (1990) argument that structural political opportunities are not very helpful in understanding dynamic processes. I analyse the importance of both variable and stable elements to see which of these claims holds up best and identify whether there are some stable elements that help to explain the final outcome.

Although the first dimension in the variable elements is *the opening up of political access*, I relate this to the consequences of the terrorist attacks. Therefore, I analyse what the immediate consequences of the attacks were. The consequence of the attacks had an immediate influence on the impact of the anti-war movement, especially the events of March 13th, in other words the spontaneous demonstration in front of the offices of the PP just one day before the elections.

After the attacks Aznar, the prime minister, tried to construct a new discourse, pointing to ETA as the instigator of the attacks. After receiving information about the possible role of Al Qaeda, the government chose to deny it and place the blame on ETA. The first socio-political consequence of the attacks was the lie about the instigators, but there was another consequence that followed from this lie: the anger and mobilization of the people. I present below some of the quotations that illustrate the consequences of the attacks.

Pilar Masana from Aturem la Guerra explains why the lies of the government tried to protect it from an election defeat:

It was the lies that made many people go to vote. People voted against the PP(. . .) My perception is that Acebes until the last moment was defending the theory of ETA, because they knew the terrorism was linked with the war in Iraq which could lead them to lose the elections

Montse, also from Aturem la Guerra, explains the reaction of the people to the lies:

People are not stupid, they know that ETA exists, who they kill and the style and type of attacks, and they are saying no, it is ETA, it is ETA, and that caused a huge spontaneous demonstration, all the people against the PP on the 13th March and the police hardly appeared.

In all the interviews the same idea is repeated: the immediate consequence of the attacks was the lie, the lie produced anger and the spontaneous mobilization. This lie attracted the political tension that had been generated during those years (2001–2004) and connected with previous mobilizations, especially the anti-war movement as the second participant explains.⁸

Sara, an activist and organizer of alternative information (information for social movements) explains:

I always consider the 13th as a culmination of a cycle of four years, which started with the LOU⁹ followed by a series of events until the final straw demanding no more lies, after the Prestige. You are not going to lie with 200 dead people on the table, the sequence was clear. The slogans of the 13th March during the whole night in the PP central office of Genova were the same as those we had been shouting for four years 'They call it democracy and it is not', 'Liars'.

Jose Luis Gordillo, a pacifist from Aturem la Guerra, explains how citizens had learnt from earlier mobilizations:

People had been demonstrating for around two years. It is such a long process that was developing and culminated with the attacks and the government's lie. Without the mobilizations of 2003 the other (referring to 13th March) could not happen.

The government's management of the lies about the ownership of the attacks reminded citizens of problems from the past, regarding lies about ecological prestige and weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (Sánchez, 2006; Sánchez and López, 2007). Also the response to the attacks was perceived to be a deceit. In response, a large portion of the citizenry angrily demonstrated in front of the offices of the PP on March 13th. During the protest, the public chants included: 'Who did the attacks? Europe knows already'; 'Liars, liars'; 'Azhar does not know it has been Al Qaeda'; 'He knows it, he knows it'; 'Television, manipulation'; 'you should not play with the deaths'; 'Do not use death to manipulate'; 'The people do not believe in the liars of the PP'; 'Azhar is guilty, you are responsible'; 'there is a lack of 200 votes because of you'; 'No to war'; 'We want information before the elections'; 'Today more than ever. Right of Information'; and 'We want to know now!' (Gómez, Ordaz, and Perejil, 2004; Rodríguez, 2004; Cue, 2004; Artal, 2004; Alvarez de Toledo, 2004). The public anger and the anticipation of a change in government constituted a process of 'cognitive liberation', in which people '*define their situation as unjust and subject to change to group action*' (McAdam, 1982: 51). The anger and the hope of change interacted to produce a movement (Aminzade and McAdam, 2001), in this case a protest. This protest had two objectives: to get the government to tell the truth about the attacks; and/or to punish the government the next day.

The demonstration on March 13th and the resulting press coverage, especially by *El País*, helped to unite the anger of the anti-war mobilizations of 2002–2003 with a wider desire to oust Azhar's PP from government. The government's deceit was transformed into an opportunity by the movement, and the opportunity for the movement was the possibility of changing the government in the next day's election. The party most likely to be the beneficiary was PSOE, a factor which leads us to the following aspect of political opportunities: the presence of influential allies.

Influential allies are an important factor in the success of social movements. The key influential ally of Spain's anti-war movement was the PSOE, a party that has been historically opposed to war.¹⁰ This was no exception in the case of the Iraq war in 2003. It positioned itself against the war along with IU and the main trade unions, CCOO and UGT. The four political actors PSOE, IU, CCOO and UGT were central allies for the movements and they made up the Madrid Social Forum along with other organizations.

Of all these actors, however, the most influential ally was the PSOE. In fact, the PSOE has strong influence in the media group PRISA, of which the radio station SER and the newspaper *El País* made an important contribution to the movement. *El País* called for demonstrations and announced the demonstrations with the dates and places, as well as the route. *El País* also announced all kinds of actions, in the form of camping, sit-ins, rallies, pickets, demonstrations, boycotting, banging pots and pans and human mosaics (*El País*, 11/4/2003).

Jose Luis Gordillo, the pacifist from Aturem la Guerra quoted earlier, says that thanks to the support of PSOE they had the mass media in their favour,

and the people on the ground accepted that the only message could be NO TO WAR, without any additional message of NO To NATO or BASES OUT. He says '*In exchange we thought it was worth it because that way we reached more people*'. Given the opportunity of having the PSOE as allies, the movement aimed to broaden its appeal and make more general demands in order to attract the support of more people.

Vicky, a student activist, explains how she and others were conscious of the influence of the PSOE on the population:

When the PSOE participates, it makes the issue appear in newspapers, on TV, so there is more visibility for the movement which already exists. Thanks to this the issue appeared on every TV news broadcast.

As Carlos Girbau from IU says, the support of the parties, especially the PSOE contributed to the impact of the anti-war movement:

There was a connection between the position of the parties (referring to IU and PSOE) and the movement, because it later helped to transform the rejection of the demonstrations into votes against Aznar.

The mobilizations on March 13th, and the others that preceded it, revealed the people's anger towards the PP, but if there had not been a party in position to win the election such as the PSOE, there would have been no way of transforming those mobilizations into votes against the PP. In turn, there would have been no possibility of withdrawing the troops from Iraq, as Zapatero did. Not only was the existence of important allies a key variable, but so too was the legitimacy this garnered for the cause. This leads us to consider the aspect of *division of elites*.

It is known that during 2003 the movement against the war on Iraq influenced some sectors, and some people in the PP distanced themselves from the executive. This was the case for Adriano del Moral in Montmelo (Catalonia), candidate to the council of the town, who put up a banner saying 'No to war, no to the weapons of mass destruction, no to hunger'. Francisco Marisca, councillor of the PP resigned because of his disagreement about the position of the PP in the war on Iraq. (*El Pais*, 11/4/2003, '*Barcelona se moviliza de nuevo el día siguiente a la toma de Bagdad?*').

In Santa Coloma de Gramenet, Juan Manuel Ruiz Garcia resigned as a member of the Municipal Group for the Plenary of the town council. He resigned with colleague Concepción Fernandez in order to vote 'without problems of conscience' in favour of a motion against the war on Iraq that was presented in that plenary session. Ruiz claimed that the Iraq conflict was immoral and unethical as there was not enough time for the inspectors (*El Pais*, 2/4/2003).

The councillors of the PP in the two towns of Andalucia where the US bases were installed distanced themselves from the official line of the PP. In the case of Moron de la Frontera (Seville), the five town councils of the PP voted in favour of a motion rejecting the war and the use of the installations of the aerial bases

in the military conflict. They also supported the anti-war mobilizations. Three of these five councillors of the PP announced that they would leave the party because of their opposition to the war on Iraq (*El Mundo* 26/03/2003). In Rota (Cadiz) all the councillors of the municipal corporations, including the PP ones, had a sit-in to plead for a peaceful solution in the conflict. (*El Pais*, 15/2/2003 'Los concejales del PP de Moron y Rota se desmarcan de su partido').

The city council of Segovia, where the PP governs, sent a resolution against the war on Iraq to the Congress (*El Mundo*, 14/3/2003). During the months of March and April 2003 resolutions approved by the support of the PP were sent to the Congress. This occurred with Lezuza (Albacete), San Vicente de la Sonsera (La Rioja) and Los Barrios (Cadiz) (*El Mundo* 20/3/2003).

In addition, a deputy from the PP, who was the president of the Commission of Justice of the Congress distanced himself from his party. He said that peace has preference over security and that a war 'against all the people' cannot be based on 'some suspicions' even if its president (referring to Saddam) is 'blood-thirsty' (*El Mundo* 31/3/2003). He explained that he is one of the sensitive ones in the PP who think that peace is a more important value than security. Also present in the demonstrations against the war on Iraq were part of the Bureau of the councils of the PP in Andalucia (*El Pais*, 16/02/2003).

All these actions within the PP propelled the movement forward with different actions and presented the image to the public that the anti-war movement was taking hold. This supports the argument of Piven and Cloward (1979) that the opportunities for the challengers are limited to times of widespread discontent when there is a division among elites. In such cases, certain elites may ally themselves with the concerns of challengers to shore up their own power base, ultimately helping to legitimate the movement's claims. In this case, the increasing legitimacy of the Spanish anti-war movement by another part of the electorate strengthened the movement. There was also another element that helped to legitimate the cause of the anti-war movement: the low level of repression by the State.

In line with Dela Porta framework (1996) I can say that in the case of the anti-war movement in Spain, it was tolerant, selective, reactive, soft and lawful. Tolerant because the majority of the demonstrations were peaceful, selective because any actions were mooted by specific leftist groups, reactive because it was always following demonstrations and actions, gentle in general because repression from the government forces consisted of fines to the demonstrators,¹¹ and more or less lawful because the demonstrators respected the laws of the government.

The most common form of repression was soft because it consisted of fines, for instance in cases in some towns in Spain: Palma de Mallorca, Valladolid, Leon, Madrid, and Tenerife. However, the denomination of lawful came hand-in-hand with harsher aspects because lawsuits were also used to shut down the freedom of expression of some groups.¹²

Despite this repression, the anti-war movement continued to demonstrate until the end, because the image of the movement was soft and legal and was

not distorted, and so people continued to demonstrate without fear. Of great significance here is the fact that there was no police repression after the attacks on the 13th of March. Robert Gonzalez from Aturem la Guerra explains: *'Also the police did not charge. It was all a bit odd. It was strange that we were demonstrating illegally on the day of reflection before the elections and nothing happened and the police did not charge anyone'*. Regarding the repression in the anti-war movement Robert from the Space of Universities, explains: *'It was a selective repression, that it was focused on the more radical streams of the movement.'*

All this made the anti-war movement more attractive for potential protestors as they had less fear of demonstrating. The tolerant and soft style of policing favoured the diffusion of protest. Also selective and legal protest policing isolated the violent wings of the movement and helped the integration of the more moderate activists (Della Porta, 1996). This kind of repression facilitated the integration and participation of all kinds of people who might otherwise never have been enrolled.

Interventions by the media

As I pointed out before, the opening or closing of media access and attention is an important element in defining political opportunities for movements (Gamson and Meyer, 1996). The first thing to note about the political economy of the mass media is that during the years of democracy in Spain, the government has had a strong influence on public and private television. (Fernández and Santana, 2000). Since the beginning of the years of transition to democracy (1977–1978 and 1978–1982), the executives showed a concern for the control of television in their politics. The general directors of RTVE (the public television network) are appointed by the executives, demonstrating the strong link between the government and the public TV.

There are messages promoting the government in the public radio stations and in the private sector in favour of the Administration. The rest of the private media adopt views critical of the executive, even creating media platforms that have given impulse to changes in government, such as the arrival of the PP to the government in 1996. (Jerez, Sampedro and Baer, 2000)

It is important to note that during the Aznar administration (2000–2004) this was no exception. TVE-1 (the public television network) proved to be more in favour of the government and the work of TVE at that time distorted the role of public television. In fact, news was presented with evaluations that were favourable to the executive and the PP. As an example, the PSOE denounced the media for not directly reporting the mobilizations of February 15th. In a summer musical show, TVE also censored criticism of the politics of Bush, the mobilizations against the war on Iraq and the Gescartera case (El País, 1/7/2003).

TVE and Antena 3 are the channels which dedicated less time to providing information about the numerous protests against the invasion of Iraq (8.5 per cent corresponding to TVE and 12.3 per cent to Antena 3).¹³ TVE-1 was the

channel that gave more voice to the government at the beginning of the conflict (43.6 per cent). One of the significant actions of TVE was not to broadcast the well-known Max Awards. After the ceremony of the Goya Awards, the Participants of the Culture Platform claimed that this was censorship from the government and they did not agree with it.¹⁴ It is important to note that a committee was created against manipulative information, composed of 351 workers of the public body. The first analysis that they made was on the period from 28th February to 5th March 2003. It shows that those at the top of RTVE performed actions in which '*the minimum criteria of veracity, pluralism and independence were not respected*'. (Culture Platform against the War).

Since the time when the socialist party was in government (1982–1996), two media groups were created that still exist nowadays. One which was made up of the newspapers *ABC*, *El Independiente*, *El Mundo* and the radio station COPE as well as sometimes *Diario 16*, and which was in favour of the opposition at the time, the PP. The other group was composed of the Newspaper *El Pais*, SER radio, *El Siglo* and Canal Plus, and was more closely linked to the government at that time, the PSOE. In general, the first group supports the PP and the second PSOE, regardless of whether they are in the government or in the opposition. (Fernandez and Santana, 2000; Reig, 1998).

At the time that we are analysing, with the PP in government and PSOE in the opposition, *El Pais*¹⁵ as well as *El Mundo* gave coverage to the anti-war movement. During the years 2003–2004 there are 100 news stories from *El Mundo* and 251 from *El Pais*. As I pointed out before, *El Pais* and the Group Prisa were important allies of the movement.¹⁶

In relation to the 11th and the attacks, the public media did not question the official theory of ETA as an author, although also they did not rule out Islamic responsibility. On the other hand, there were other media that sided with the idea of Islamic authorship and accused the government of withholding information. (Arroyo and Roel, 2006).

We can see from this, that part of the mass media was critical of the government and gave more visibility to the anti-war movement. This influenced public opinion. In fact, 90.8 per cent did not agree with the military intervention in February 2003 and maintained this opinion until March 2004 (CIS, Centre for Sociological Research. In Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas).¹⁷

Concluding comments

Despite the difficulty of studying the impacts of social movements, and despite the lack of theory surrounding the subject, the foregoing analysis of political-opportunity structures can shed some light on the topic of a movement's policy impact. Specifically there is an ongoing debate surrounding the elements that ought to be considered as part of a political-opportunity structure, and this paper has sought to contribute to this discussion.

Meyer and Minkoff (2004) ask the question 'political-opportunity for what?' – recognizing that the political environment provides consistent and variable

influences. The consistent elements of the political structure in the present Spanish case are closed: they include a legislative branch with limited independence from the executive, and one that was dominated by one party (PP) due to the electoral law; interest groups that do not really interact fluidly with the government; and a judicial system closed to citizen's demands and with limited independence in the resolution of conflict (for details of these more specific factors, see Appendix).

Among the stable elements, the current party system in Spain provided the possibility of different party allies such as the IU, PSOE, and mass media helping to spread the cause of the movement and legitimate their demands. However, these stable elements have one feature in common, the PSOE, which is connected to the variable elements: the presence of influential allies.

The other variable elements include the government's response to a terrorist attack, the patent lies which were essential for triggering a protest, in this case the March 13th protest which united the anti-war protests with the demand for a change in government. Also, the division of elites in the PP and the recourse to soft repression (even on March 13th) both helped to legitimate the anti-war movement's cause. All this suggests that the structural obstacles of a political system, coupled with one-party majority rule in Congress (PP), can be overcome if there is coverage of the movement by the media and a main party supports the movement's cause.

This said, we should not forget that the protest of 13th March (and its coverage) was crucial in linking past mobilizations with a diminution in support for the government a day before a general election. Emotions and memories were united by the possibility of change and the attainment of the movement's goals. In contrast to the argument offered by Meyer and Minkoff (2004), all this supports the idea that the variable elements of political-opportunity structure, along with the stable element of the mass media's structural role, were crucial factors in determining this particular movement's impact not only on policy but also on events.

Appendix: Background to a discussion of stable elements and unstable alignments

Concerning the variable elements, it is worth highlighting the importance of unstable alignments. There were no unstable alignments, because the PP (the right-wing party) was in government with an absolute majority, and it did not need any support or coalitions of other parties. Also it was the second legislature in government. This leads us to analyse the features of the political system that created the possibility of one party governing on the basis of an absolute majority, as well as other elements that can explain the outcome of the movement. I differentiate between input (how much the system is open to new demands) and output structures (how the policies are implemented) (Kitschelt, 1986).

Recalling the elements of the political system's openness to new demands, we firstly have to consider the *structure of the political parties*. The name that it is attributed to the parties of the political system is *moderate pluralism* or *moderate multipartidism*, composed of two majority parties PSOE (centre-left), PP (centre-right), one which is less significant in the national sphere, IU (United Left), and the constant presence of two nationalistic parties of the centre-right, the PNV (Nationalist Basque Party) in the Basque country and the CIU (Convergence and Union) in Catalonia.

As there are a wide range of parties, movements find it easy to find different allies. As I explained, the PSOE and the IU were allies of the movement. Generally speaking, with regards to the political parties, we can consider Spain to have a system which is open to new demands.

Regarding the *electoral system*, Spain has a proportional system with majority correction. The province is the electoral circumscription. For the assignment of seats in the Congress of deputies there is a legal barrier related to electoral circumscription.¹⁸ The formulas of conversion of votes into seats are simple in the two chambers (The Congress and the Senate). For the composition of the Congress of Deputies, the D'Hondt formula is used. In the distribution of seats, this method tends to over-represent the parties with the highest number of votes, especially in the small circumscriptions. In the case of the Senate, the process of conversion of votes into seats is simpler. A majoritarian system is applied in which candidates who obtain the most votes are elected until the total of number of senators assigned to that circumscription has been filled. (Crespo, 1997). The system which favours the big parties, has encouraged the formation of parliamentary majorities that have created strong and stable governments. (Laiz Castro, 2002).

As an effect of the element indicated, parliamentary representation has been concentrated on the two major parties, PP and PSOE.¹⁹ The openness of the party system to demands contrasts with the electoral system. This makes use of the 'useful vote', the election of one of the majority parties instead of the party that is closest ideologically in the spectrum. This especially tends to happen to the IU in relation to the PSOE. A high percentage vote goes to the PSOE instead of the IU, as it is more likely to govern. This means that although the IU was an important ally of the anti-war movement, PSOE is the only ally with potential to govern. This 'useful vote' restricted the outcome of the anti-war movement. The alternative for change was therefore focused on the PSOE and not the IU, although the IU has had a more clear position against the war since the beginning than PSOE.²⁰

The second element in the input structures of Kitschelt is the *independence of the legislatures*. The more the legislatures develop and control policies independently of the executive, the more open the system. In the case of Spain, the process of compiling the budget law, the amendments which are aimed at increasing or decreasing the budget require the approval of the government. The Parliament can delegate legislative competence in the government through the law of the rules for articulating texts. The Parliament then approves a

general principle (in the rules outlined) that are subsequently developed in texts (laws with articles). The Congress also decides the validation or repeal of the law decrees that the government dictates in cases of urgent necessity (Sanchez de Dios, 2002).

Generally speaking, we can say that legislative production is low compared with the Italian or German parliament. Although the committees do a very good job, some of the culture of our political elites is orientated towards giving the capacity of legislating to the executive branch (Sanchez de Dios, 2002).

It is important to note that the Spanish system of legislative-executive relations has been defined as the most pro-government system in Europe, as a system of the hegemony of the prime minister (Lopez Nieto, 1997). In the context of the anti-war movement, the legislature was even more connected with the executive because of the PP's absolute majority in Congress. This is partly due to the features of the electoral system in Spain which privileges major parties and majorities as stated above.

The third element refers to the patterns of intermediation between interest groups and the executive branch.²¹ In Spanish political-administrative history, the relations between the groups of interest and the Public administrations has been significant. Neither were the Public Administration interested in having contact with the diverse individual interests that exist in society, nor would they contemplate a relation different from 'favouritism'. A radical separation was established between the 'general interests' represented in the Administration and the 'private interests' of the individuals. Parallel to this concept, the channels of communication between the private interests and the Administration worked in an informal way in the tradition of 'favouritism' (Molins, 1997).

In general, the density of affiliation to different groups is very low. There is a certain mistrust amongst the citizens in relation to their capacity to influence public policies through their integration in organized groups. This is connected with a political culture of delegated participation, where the generic trust in the representative organizations of interest is compatible with a minimum link to them. Besides, the Public administrations prefer to have privileged relations with certain groups to which they in turn give certain privileges (Molins, 1997).

Taking all this into account, we can say that the relationship with the executive branch through the public administration with the interests groups is not transparent and does not promote openness within the system. The closeness of the system encouraged the two main trade unions as groups of interests (CCOO and UGT) to collaborate as allies rather than as interlocutors of the public administration.

The fourth element is the existence of mechanisms that aggregate demands. In this regard, the first mechanism that aggregates demands from society is political parties, an aspect which has already been discussed.

Kitschelt (1986) also points out three operational dimensions to characterize the capacity of political systems to implement policies. However, I disregard the first two because they are not relevant for my analysis as I said before. The third

element that Kitschelt points out is the relative independence and authority of the judiciary system in the resolution of political conflict. In Spain, the General Council of the Judiciary Power is elected in an indirect manner by the legislature. In practice, the General Council of the Judiciary Power has been elected because of party criteria rather than professional knowledge. Interest from parties has halted the job of the General Council of the Judiciary Power due to the lack of consensus between the majority parties in renewing the positions. The General Council of the Judiciary power is not subjected to any political control. The relation between the General Council of the Judiciary Power and the Ministry of Justice is based on the principle that it is the former who studies and designs public policy and then proposes it to the government and the parliament. It seems that there is certain independence of the judiciary in relation to the executive, but in practice there have been many connections between the role of the judiciary and the political sphere (Alcántara and Martínez, 1997). Regarding the antiwar case, the Platform culture against the war, together with the free association of lawyers, decided to submit a lawsuit against Aznar in April 2003, and the public was invited to sign up to it. Many people took the opportunity to sign up, but the High Court in Spain decided to shelve this lawsuit in January 2004. This shows how the judicial system is closed to citizens' demands and it is very connected with the executive.

Finally there is one stable element that exerts a greater influence than all the other stable elements that are usually theorized (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986) and for this reason this is discussed at length in the text of the paper.

Notes

- 1 The idea of political-opportunity structure, implicitly developed by Lipsky (1968), was made more explicit in the 1970s: first by Eisinger (1973) who operationalized it cross-sectionally using local political institutions, then by Piven and Cloward (1979), who claimed that electoral instability is the major source of political-opportunity. After that Jenkins and Perrow (1977) paid particular attention to the external resources of farm workers. The concept was then developed more formally by Tilly (1978), McAdam (1982), Tarrow (1994, 1996, 2004)) and Kitschelt (1986). The concept of political-opportunity structure has been used to study women's movements (Katzenstein and Mueller, 1987), antinuclear movements (Kitschelt, 1986) and Civil Rights movement (McAdam, 1982). It has been used in Tarrow's research on religious insurgency (1988) and in his study on the cycle of protest in Italy 1965–1975 (1989). Other authors have also done case studies using POS (Brockett, 1991; Costain, 1992; della Porta, 1995; Duyvendak, 1995; Kitschelt, 1986; Koopmans, 1995; Meyer, 1993; Rucht, 1994; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1975).
- 2 Another useful definition is suggested by Brockett (1991: 254) '*the configuration of forces in a (potential or actual) group's political environment that influences that group's assertion of its political claims*'.
- 3 The concept of political-opportunity structure goes back to the last upheaval of The West, the 1960s. (Tarrow, 2004: 111).
- 4 Tilly defines repression as '*whatever action by part of a group that elevates the cost of collective action of the contending. One action that reduces the cost of collective action is a form of facilitation*' (Tilly, 1978: 100).

- 5 This perspective of the State as a predictor of collective action is explained in Kriesi *et al.* (1995)
- 6 Kitschelt (1986) also points out three operational dimensions to characterize the capacity of the political systems to implement policies. However, I disregard the first two on the grounds that they are not relevant to my analysis. In fact, centralization vs. decentralization does not affect the implementation of policies when we are talking about foreign policy. Secondly, government control over market participants again does not affect foreign policy. The third element that Kitschelt points out is the relative independence and authority of the judiciary system in the resolution of political conflict.
- 7 In this sense, my view is different from Crossley (2002) who considers what he calls 'the media opportunities structure' to be unstable.
- 8 There were previous mobilizations against the new education law (LOU) 2002, against the labour reform 'el decretazo' in 2002, against the ecological disaster of the Prestige and finally against the war and the attacks. For an analysis of this see Sánchez, I 'Why the PP lost the general elections? A discursive analysis', from the University of Essex, MA Dissertation.
- 9 LOU stands for Organic Law of Universities passed in the Congress by the PP majority.
- 10 Especially during the period when it had a Marxist ideology until 1979. For the socialists, whilst they had a Marxist ideology, the war resulted from the clash of interests between two blocs of capitalist societies who disputed by forcing the markets and sourcing cheap raw materials. The war is a consequence of the competitive capitalist system (Gómez Llorente, 1972: 162). After abandoning the Marxist ideology the Socialist Party has distinguished between just and unjust wars. A war is considered just when it is approved by UN resolutions such as the case of Afghanistan (2001- onwards), unjust wars are those not approved by UN such as the case of Iraq.
- 11 There were only a few cases of violence, which were in Alicante in action by Colectivo Tortuga, Bilbao (Basque Country) and some demonstrations in Madrid at the beginning of March 2003. In this case the strategy of the demonstrators was to carry video cameras to record these violent events. But it is important to note that the majority of demonstrations resulted in no incidents.
- 12 For instance the lawsuit interposed by the PP (government party) against a website called www.noalaguerra.org was publicly known, as was the incident of the professor at the Complutense University, Carlos Monedero, because students were involved who said that deputies of the PP were 'murderers' and 'accomplices to murders' in that website created by the professor. This was also the case with the investigation by the Security Forces of a website of social movements called www.nodo50.org because there were campaigns threatening leaders of the PP.
- 13 However, the channels that dedicated more time to the spontaneous demonstration of the people were Barcelona Television who dedicated 42.9% of time to the conflict, followed by TV-3 (also from Catalonia) with 26.9%. (*El País*, 29/3/2003, La Guerra de Irak dispara el consumo de informativos).
- 14 It is important to note the demonstration of 500 students in the RTVE offices to denounce the manipulation of RTVE by the government. The Goya Awards ceremony on the TV was the starting point of the anti-war movement, from which public opinion started to rise against the war. In the ceremony the actors wore bands saying 'No to war' and some of them spoke about it.
- 15 It is important to note that *El País* is the most read newspaper during the democracy. (Arroyo and Roel, 2006).
- 16 There are also other media groups which were born from newspapers. Prisa started from *El País*, Correo from *El Correo Español-El Pueblo Vasco*, Godó from *la Vanguardia*, Recoletos from *Marca* and *Actualidad Económica*, 16 from *Diario 16* and Zeta from *El Periodico de Cataluña*, *Tiempo*. (Arroyo and Roel, 2006: 215). Generally speaking, in Spain we can distinguish between Telefónica Group, RTVE, Prisa, Zeta, Correo, Godó, *Prensa Española*, *Voz*, *Moll*, *Semana*, *Joly*, *Nuevo Lunes*, *Negocios* and *MAJ*. The first three are more relevant and influential (Reig, 1998).
- 17 CIS, Centre for Sociological Research, located in Spain.

- 18 To specify, the list of candidates that cannot surpass the minimum of 3% of valid votes in their circumscription are not taken into account.
- 19 Between 1977 and 1996 the two major parties obtained 69.7% of the votes which translated into 83.7% of the seats (Crespo, 1997: 240).
- 20 It is important to note that at the beginning there were doubts as to whether the PSOE should participate on the streets or not, 'there was an internal debate about if it was convenient to support the action on the streets or not' (Javier Dolz, International Secretary of CCOO). Finally Zapatero opted for supporting the action in the streets. It was after the Goya Awards (February 1st 2003) and after the action in Congress (5th February 2003) when the PSOE also called for the demonstration on 15th February 2003. In the war on Afghanistan there was no involvement from the PSOE. The position of the IU (United Left) against the war was clearer from the beginning, but they do not have the power of influence on the mass media the PSOE has. The IU was born from the anti-NATO mobilizations in 1984–86 when the PSOE in the government sided with the Spanish participation in the NATO alliance.
- 21 There are several interest groups in Spain. The enterprises are organized around the Spanish Confederation of the Enterprise Organizations (CEOE). The trade unions are organized around two majority organizations, the General Union of Workers (UGT) and Workers Commissions (CCOO). Other groups connected with cattle and farming are: the National Confederation of Farmers and Cattle (CNAG), the National Centre for Young Farmers (CNJA), The Coordinator of Organizations of Farmers and Cattle (COAG) and the Union of Small Farmers (UPA). Other interest groups are the professional schools and also the Catholic Church and other religious organizations.

References

- Alcántara, M. and A. Martínez, (1997), *Política y gobierno en España*, Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch
- (1997), 'El poder de los jueces' in Alcántara, M. and A. Martínez, (eds), *Política y Gobierno*, Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
- Amenta, E., B. Carruthers and Y. Zylan, (1992), 'A Hero for an aged? The Townsend movement, the political mediation model and US Old-Age policy, 1934–1950, *American Journal of Sociology*, 98: 308–39.
- Amenta, E., K. Dunleavy and M. Bernstein, (1994), 'Stolen Thunder? Huey Long's Share Our Wealth, Political Mediation and the Second New Deal', *American Sociological Review*, 59: 678–702
- Amenta, E., R. Tamarelli and M. Young, (1996), 'The Old Folks at Home: Political Mediation Theory and Impact of Townsend Movement in California' Unpublished manuscript
- Amenta, E. and P. Young, (1999), 'Democratic States and Social Movements: Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses', *Social Problems*, 57: 153–68.
- Aminzade, R. and D. McAdam, (2001), 'Emotions and Contentious Politics', in Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William II Sewell, Jr. Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, (eds), *Silence and Voice in the study of Contentious Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Andrews, K., (1997), 'The Impacts of Social Movements on the Political Process: the civil rights movement and black electoral politics in Mississippi', *American Sociological Review*, 62: 800–819.
- Arroyo, M. and M. Roel, (2006), *Los medios de comunicación en la democracia (1982–2005): prensa, radio, televisión e Internet y grupos de comunicación*, Madrid: Fragua.
- Artal, R. M. (2004), *11M-14M. Onda expansiva*. Madrid: Espejo de Tinta
- Banaszak, L. A., (1996), *Why movements succeed or fail: Opportunity, Culture and the Struggle for woman suffrage*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Barreiro, B., (2004), '14M: Elecciones a la sombra del terrorismo,' in *Claves de la Razón Práctica* 141, April 2004.
- Brockett, C., (1991), 'The structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America' *Comparative politics*: 253–74.
- Burstein, P, R. Einwohner and J. Hollander, (1995), 'The success of political movements: a bargaining perspective' in Jenkins, C. and B. Klandermans, (eds), *The Politics of Social Protest*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Burstein, P., (1979), 'Public opinion, demonstrations and the Passage of Antidiscrimination Legislation', *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 43: 157–72.
- Burstein, P., (1985), *Discrimination, Jobs and Politics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Costain, A., (1992), *Inviting Women's Rebellion: A Political Process Interpretation of the Women's Movement*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Cress, D. and D. Snow, (2000), 'The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The influence of Organization, Disruption, Political Mediation and Framing', *American Journal of Sociology*, 105: 1063–104.
- Crespo, I., (1997), 'El sistema electoral' in Alcántara, M. and A. Martínez, (eds), *Política y Gobierno en España*, Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
- Crossley, N., (2002), *Making sense of Social Movements*, Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- Cue, C. (2004), *Pásalo! Los cuatro días de marzo que cambiaron un país*, Barcelona: Editorial península.
- de Toledo, A., (2004), *Los cuatro días de Marzo. De las mochilas de la muerte al vuelco electoral*, Barcelona: Ed Planeta.
- Della Porta, D., (1995), *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Della Porta, D., (1996), 'Social movements and the state: Thoughts on the policing of protest' in McAdam, D., J. McCarthy and M. Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Duyvendak, J. W., (1995), *The power of politics: new social movements in France*, Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.
- Eisinger, P., (1973), 'The conditions of protest behaviour in American cities', *American Political Science Review*, 67: 11–28.
- Fernández, I. and F. Santana, (2000), *Estado y medios de comunicación en la España democrática*, Madrid: Alianza.
- Font, J. and A. Mateos, (2007), 'La participación electoral' in Montero, J., I. Lago and M. Torcal, (eds), *Elecciones generales 2004*, Madrid, CIS.
- Gamson, W., (1990), *The Strategy of Social Protest*, 2nd edn., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- Gamson, W. and D. Meyer, (1996), 'Framing political-opportunity' in McAdam, D., J. McCarthy and M. Zald, (eds), *Comparative perspectives on Social movements*, New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Giugni, M., D. McAdam and C. Tilly, (1999), *How movements matter*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Giugni, M., (1998), 'Was it worth the effort? The outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24: 371–93.
- Giugni, M., (1999), 'How social movements matter: past research, present problems, future developments' in Giugni, M., D. McAdam and C. Tilly, (eds), *How Social Movements Matter*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Goldstone, J., (1980), 'The weakness of Organization: a new look at Gamson's the Strategy of Social Protest', *American Journal of Sociology*, 85: 1017–42.
- Gómez-Llorente, E., (1972), *Aproximación a la historia del socialismo español (hasta 1921)*, Madrid: EDICUSA.
- Gómez, L., P. Ordaz and F. Perejil, (2004), 'Las crónicas del 11M', Special edition *El País*. http://www.elpais.com/especiales/2004/cronica11m/docs/lacronica_11m_h.pdf

- Holstein, J. and J. Gubrium, (1997), 'Active interviewing' in Silverman, D., (ed.), *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice*, London: Sage.
- Jenkins, C. and C. Perrow, (1977), 'Insurgency of the powerless: Farm Worker movements (1946–1972)', *American Sociological Review*, 42: 249–68.
- Jerez, A., V. Sampedro and A. Baer, (2000), *Medios de comunicación, consumo informativo y actitudes políticas en España*, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
- Katzentesin, M. and C. Mueller, (1987), *The Women's Movement of the United States and Western Europe: Conciousness, Political-opportunity and Public Policy*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Kitschelt, H., (1986), 'Political Opportunities structures and Political Protest: Anti-nuclear movements in four democracies' *British Journal of Political Science*, 16: 57–85.
- Klandermans, B. and S. Goslinga, (1996), 'Media discourse, movement publicity and the generation of collective action frames: Theoretical and empirical exercises in meaning construction' in McAdam, D., J. McCarthy and M. Zald (eds), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Kolb, F. (2007), *Protest and Opportunities. The Political Outcomes of Social Movements*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Koopmans, R., (1995), *Democracy from below: New Social Movements and the political system in West Germany*, Berlin: Westview Press.
- Kriesi, H., (1991), 'The Political-opportunity structure of New Social Movements: Its impact on their mobilization', WZB, 91:103.
- Kriesi, H., (1995), 'The political opportunity structure of new social movements: its impact on their mobilization', pp. 167–98 in J. C. Jenkins and B. Klandermans, (eds), *The Politics of Social Protest*. Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press; London: UCL Press.
- Kriesi, H., R. Koopmans, J. Duyvendak, and M. Giugni, (1992), 'New Social Movements and Political Opportunities in Western Europe,' *European Journal of Political Research*, 22: 219–44.
- Kriesi, H., R. Koopmans, J. Duvvendak and M. Giugni, (1995), *New Social Movements in Western Europe. A comparative analysis*, USA: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kornhauser, W., (1959), *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe, III: The Free Press.
- Lago, I. and J. Montero, (2005), 'Los mecanismos del cambio electoral del 11M and 14M' in *Claves de la Razón Práctica*, 149, January/February 2005.
- Laiz, C., (2002), 'Las elecciones y los sistemas electorales' in Román, P., (ed), *Sistema Político Español*, Madrid: McGraw-Hill.
- Lipsky, M., (1968), 'Protest as a political resource,' *American Political Science Review*, 62: 1144–58.
- Lipsky, M., (1970), *Protest in City politics*, Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Lopez, N. L., (1997), 'El Parlamento' in Alcántara, M. and A. Martínez, (eds), *Política y Gobierno en España*, Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
- Maguire, M., (1995), 'Similarities between social Movements and Political Parties' in *The Politics of Social Protest*, Jenkins, C. and B. Klandermans (eds), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- McAdam, D., J. McCarthy, and M. Zald, (eds) (1996), *Comparative perspectives on social movements*, New York, Cambridge University Press.
- McAdam, D., (1982), *Political Process and the development of black insurgency, 1930–1970*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McAdam, D., (1996), 'Conceptual Origins, current problems and future directions' in McAdam, D., J. McCarthy and M. Zald, (eds), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, New York: Cambridge University Press: 23–40.
- Meyer, D., (1993), 'Peace protest and Policy: Explaining the rise and decline of Antinuclear movements in Postwar America,' *Policy Studies Journal*, 21: 29–51.
- Meyer, D. and D. Minkoff, (2004), 'Conceptualizing Political-opportunity,' *Social Forces*, 82: 1457–92.
- Miles, M. and A. Huberman, (1994), *Qualitative Data analysis: an expanded sourcebook* (2nd edn), London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

- Molins, J., (1997), 'Los grupos de interés' in Alcántara, M and Martínez, A, *Política y Gobierno en España*, Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
- Montero, J. and I. Lago, (2007), 'Del 11M al 14M: terrorismo, gestión del gobierno y rendición de cuentas', in Montero, L. and M. Torcal, (eds), *Elecciones generales 2004*, Madrid: CIS.
- Patton, M., (1990), *Qualitative evaluation and research methods* (2nd edn), Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Piven, F. and R. Cloward, (1979), *Poor People's movement*, New York: Vintage.
- Rochon, T. and D. Mazmanian, (1993), 'Social Movements and the Policy Process', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 528: 75–87.
- Rodriguez, P., (2004), *11M. Mentira de Estado. Los tres días que acabaron con Aznar*. Barcelona: Ediciones B.
- Reig, R., (1998), *Medios de comunicación y poder en España: radio, prensa, televisión y mundo editorial*, Barcelona: Paidós.
- Román, P., (2002), (ed.), *Sistema político español*, Madrid: McGraw-Hill.
- Román, P., (2002), 'Los partidos y los sistemas de partidos' in Román, P., (ed.), *Sistema Político Español*, Madrid: McGraw-Hill.
- Román, P., (2002), 'El Gobierno' in Román, P., (ed.), *Sistema Político Español*, Madrid: McGraw-Hill.
- Rucht, D., (1994), *Modernisierung und neue soziale Bewegungen, Deutschland, Frankreich und USA im Vergleich*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
- Rucht, D., (1990), 'Campaigns, Skirmishes and Battles: Anti-nuclear movements in the USA, France and West Germany', *Industrial Crisis Quarterly* 4: 193–222.
- Rucht, D., (1996), 'The impact of national contexts on social movements structures: a cross-movement and cross-national comparison' in McAdam, D., J. McCarthy and M. Zald, (eds) *Comparative perspectives on social movements*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sanchez de Dios, M., (2002), 'Las Cortes, el Congreso de los Diputados y el Senado' in Román, P., (ed.), *Sistema Político Español*, Madrid: McGraw-Hill.
- Sánchez, I., (2006), 'The four days that change Spain?: a discourse theory response' Master Dissertation, University of Essex.
- Sánchez, I. and S. López, (2007), 'De la LOU al 14M: actores sociales, opinion pública, poder político', IX Spanish Congress of Sociology, Research Committee of Political Sociology, Completed Papers.
- Sanz, A. and A. Sierra, (2005), 'Las elecciones generales de 2004 en España: Política exterior, estilo de gobierno y movilización. Working paper 48, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.
- Sawyers, T. and D. Meyer, (1999), 'Missed Opportunities: Social Movement Abeyance and Public Policy', *Social Problems* 46: 187–206.
- Schumaker, P., (1975), 'Policy Responsiveness to protest-group demands', *Journal of Politics*, 37: 488–521.
- Selznick, P., (1960), *The Organizational Weapon*, New York: The Free Press.
- Silverman, D., (2006), *Interpreting Qualitative data*, London: Sage Publications.
- Tarrow, S., (1983), *Struggling to Reform: Social Movements and Policy Change During Cycles of Protest*, *Western Societies Program Occasional Paper* n°15. Cornell University, Ithaca NY: New York Centre for International Studies.
- Tarrow, S., (1988), 'National Politics and Collective Action: Recent theory and Research in Western Europe and United States', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 14: 421–40.
- Tarrow, S., (1989), *Democracy and disorder. Protest and Politics in Italy 1965–1975*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tarrow, S., (1991), 'Struggle, politics and reform: collective action, social movements and cycles of protest' Cornell studies in International Affairs. *Western Societies Paper* n°21.
- Tarrow, S., (1993), 'Social Protest and Policy Reform: May 1968 and the Loi d'Orientation in France', *Comparative Political Studies*, 25: 579–607.
- Tarrow, S., (1994), *Power in movement, Social Movements, Collective action and mass politics in the modern state*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Tarrow, S., (1996), 'States and opportunities: The political structuring of social movements', in McAdam, D., J. McCarthy and M. Zald, (eds), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, S., (1998), *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, S., (2004), *El poder en movimiento, Los movimientos sociales, la acción colectiva y la política*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
- Tilly, C., (1978), *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Reading Mass: Addison-Wesley.
- Tilly, C., L. Tilly and R. Tilly, (1975), *The Rebellious Century 1830–1930*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Internet sources:

www.elpais.es
www.elmundo.es
www.cis.es
www.noalaguerra.org
www.culturacontralaguerra.org