

STRENGTHENING A DIFFICULT NATION. HISTORY AND NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY SPAIN.*

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The aim of this study is to show how the concept of Spain prevailing today originates from the nationalist ideology pertaining to the 19th century. The creation of this concept served both to justify the new power relations established during the liberal revolution, and to give coherence to a political programme independent of other states and nations. For historiography, the emergence of the concept of the “Spanish nation” had decisive consequences. From history *ad usum delphinis*, there was a change to a genealogy of Spain where a teleological interpretation justified the formation of a Nation-state then under construction against feudal and absolutist powers. Historiography, as a part of liberal and romantic thought, was the architect of a temporary, determinist construction, in which the Spanish nation and the Nation-State of the 19th century were inextricably interwoven into one and the same reality with no beginning. Hence, within the historical concept of Spain, there was a meta-story imposing an essential, new memory and which has subsequently been reproduced at different levels in the history of the country’s autonomous regions or in local history, as variations on the principal narrativeⁱ.

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Such an account of history did not emerge from an earlier national reality. In effect, the State was born out of different entities (feudal states, principalities, kingdoms) amassed by the dynasties of the Old Regime in successive wars, marriage alliances and accidents of fate. The concept of power was regarded as the patrimony of a few interchangeable people, inheritable, conquerable depending on their strengths and ambitions. This power had been geographically attributed as Spanish or Hispanic but had never had any national significance. It was in the year 1812, the same year that the first Spanish constitution, the so-called Cadiz Constitution, was drawn up, that Spain was defined for the first time as a socio-political concept, as an idea which identified a community called “the Spanish nation” and which defined itself as “the coming together of all Spaniards from both hemispheres” in reference to the citizens who lived both in the mother country and in the inherited colonies of the old empireⁱⁱ.

This was the first social pact between the people who, protected under one State, were no longer subjects but became instead citizens, since the Spanish nation—as laid down in article two—“is not, nor can be the patrimony of any family or person”. However, this early concept of nation already contained different perspectives which cannot be forgotten. There was not only the traditionalist and federal viewpoint, but also, above all, the Americanist perspective, which would very soon see itself excluded from the state representation system and cut off in successive wars of independence. So the Spanish nation, once constituted, was immediately greatly reduced in geographical, demographic and cultural terms. As a result, under the new constitutional text of 1837, the interests which defined the nation’s sovereignty belonged exclusively to the peninsula. Moreover, in the name of these national, peninsular interests, equal conditions were denied to the territories of the Antilles and the Philippines.

Thus Spain as a nation was established, not only from ideas, but, above all, from governing interests which nationalised Church and common property, abolished customs duties and protected marketsⁱⁱⁱ. After almost two centuries, the reduction in Spain’s territory in 1812 to that of Spain in the year 2000 reveals significant changes in the role of Spain’s ruling classes on the international arena. Nevertheless, the myth of the nation persists as though that had never happened. The present day Constitution, in force since 1978, does not define territorial borders but does establish in article 2

“the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common, indivisible land of all the Spanish people”. Between 1812 and 1978, the borders have changed so much that neither the “Spanish Nation” which was constituted subject to political sovereignty, is the same in the one year as in the other, nor is the subsequent nationalism that supports it organised in the same way.^{iv} However, the word Spain and especially the concept of nation associated with it remains an immutable concept. For this reason it is important to unravel the process involved in the construction of the historical discourse of Spanish nationalism, which we accept as if it were objective fact, without venturing to differentiate ideology from empirical content. The following pages are concerned with concrete aspects of the role of history in the construction of Spain as a nation and of the meaning attributed and applied to the historical discourse in its different variants, one concerned with the education and formation of Spanish patriots and one which established the collective memory based on common national pride and a shared social ideal.

1.- Cultural frailty and a strong State

It is worth clarifying the premise for this paper: that the nation-state established during the 19th century had sufficient strength to support cultural nationalism. It is true that in the case of Spain there has been much debate about the weakness of this State, about the fragmentation of the bourgeoisie which sustained it and about the effectiveness of its actions among a mainly illiterate population.^v Despite these limitations, the role of the liberal State as a pillar for the construction of capitalism from the mid-19th century cannot be denied: it was the State that nationalised basic wealth (especially land, mines, railways, etc.), and then immediately privatised it and created the “property-owning class”. Through the State, the speculative wealth of early capitalism was forged and through the State the legality of economic development was channelled and adjusted to serve the interests of the ruling classes, who existed thanks to this very same State^{vi}.

At the same time, the State was also the nation’s creator of cultural affairs. It would be a lengthy process to analyse the profound transformation which the role of culture played within the national revolution of liberalism. This occurred in Spain between the final decades of the 18th century with enlightened patriotism and halfway

through the 19th century with the manufacturing of a Spain that was so unified in the imagination both culturally and politically. It was a structural transformation which, due to the educational system and, above all, to the press, signified a completely new use of culture. Once the monopoly of the privileged few, the majority of whom were ecclesiastics, this state culture became the support of the new liberal citizens, those with the right to vote due to their income, property, profession or ability. In the imagination of these new middle classes, who were the force behind the liberal revolution, the idea of a common Spain established itself city by city while local and regional royalties still held firm. A civic, political nationalism was established promoted by the State and its subsequent mechanisms of institutional organisation. Among these, one should not underestimate the restricted electoral processes which, from 1836, were regulated and irreversible for the few hundred thousand male landowners or liberal professionals. This same political nationalism had sufficient energy and strength to overthrow the *old regime* and to lay the foundations for the development of Spanish capitalism.

An interesting, little-researched aspect, showing the action of the State in the shaping of the collective memory, is the creation, throughout the 19th century, of a national heritage. For this, the State employed a whole range of instruments, such as the patronage of the arts, the work of the academies and the creation of archaeological and historical museums. This process led to extensive artistic output which, although now largely forgotten, inundated public places and public memory. It can be seen in the statues which stand in public squares and gardens in cities and towns throughout the country. They filled the 19th century urban areas with national heroes and, as Carlos Reyero has rightly pointed out, none of the monuments erected during this period depict any character who is not Spanish. "So there is a process of identification between the effigy and its appurtenance to a certain fatherland. Its military, political, social and cultural values belong to the heritage of a national community. They are a valuable example to be followed. They are valued, not so much for themselves but because the fact that they are members of our group fills us with pride."^{vii}

This same presence is to be found in the monumental paintings depicting historical themes commemorating glorious moments in the nation's history, which formed a whole artistic genre covering the walls of official and administrative buildings

which housed the offices of the new State. Labelled by an art historian as “an administrative genre, the product of historical and state circumstances”, fundamental to their production were the commissions and purchases by the new institutions which were emerging under the protection of the State. So a painting of the conversion of the Visigothic king to Catholicism was painted in 1888 by Muñoz Degraín to decorate the Senate Conference Hall, where *The surrender of Granada* by Francisco Padilla and *Roger de Flor’s assault on Constantinople* by Moreno Carbonero also hung. Then there were the themes related to Columbus and the Catholic Kings which were valued not just for their artistic qualities but also for their historical accuracy^{viii}.

However, the greatest impact of the formulation of a nationalist ideology by the State was in education. Once history was made a compulsory school subject, there was a flood of textbooks summarizing the State’s historical standpoint. Not only did the State control the content of these textbooks, it also established the recruitment procedures for the appointment of teaching professionals. Thanks to the education system, the former subjects of a dynasty became citizens of one and the same nation and patriots with the same interests. All the resources of the new liberal society were deployed in order to preach the civic religion of a whole nation whose identity superimposed its constituent parts and its social contradictions. Moreover, in the work of the historians the nation acquired the status of a scientific account which was fed, in summarised form, into the various textbooks which, from 1838 the State decreed for the teaching of patriotic sentiment in schools. This was a national school, equal for all, which taught Castilian grammar at the same time as the history of Spanish patriotism. To the great cultural diversity inherited by the liberal State it was necessary to add the ingredients and sew the seeds that would support the collective idea of all that was Spanish.

The teaching of history throughout the 19th and 20th centuries has been researched recently by different authors so there is no need to dwell on this theme.^{ix} However, it is worth pointing out that the 1857 General Law of Public Instruction, known as the Moyano law, established that Museums, Archives and Libraries were important elements in the organisation of teaching. Ten years later this law was to become more concrete. In 1867 a Royal Decree was published which established the foundation of the Madrid National Archaeological Museum, and of provincial museums

housing archaeological exhibits from each province, to be handed over by the provincial Monuments Commissions.

As often occurs, the exposure of motives offers us clues to understanding the legislator. So it is interesting to note the following paragraph: "Our peninsula, the privileged theatre of various invasions and colonisations, guards in its breast some precious remains from its indigenous peoples, from the ancestors of the noble Iberian race.our duty is to gather together these vestiges, which help so much to elucidate the annals of those times, which providentially prepared the way for modern civilisation".

The text does not need explaining. Nor need we comment on the account of the museum's inauguration ceremony in 1871 by Amadeo de Saboya, after it had been successfully commissioned following the events of the 1868 revolution. A cantata composed especially for the occasion and performed by pupils from the National School of Music, proclaimed: "*Everything here, every object shows/ the path traced by genius/ Whose breast cannot be stirred/ by enthusiasm, by vivid emotion?/ Glorious, venerable treasures/Today, science changed our fortune/And you will find life, not death/In the tomb which the Nation bequeaths you*"^x

The tomb which the nation bequeathed to the glories of the past was the National Archaeological Museum. Reports from the time suggest it was not visited by large numbers. It contained collections from the National Library, coins and objects which had originally been housed in the Royal Library and from the Natural Science Museum whose origins were in the Royal Cabinet of Natural History founded by king Charles III. Other collections, signs of the new times, were gradually added. Some came from private collections belonging to members of the aristocracy or from the members of the enlightened upper middle classes, such as the Marquis of Salamanca or the Marquis of Cerralbo or from scholars such as Antonio Vives. They were either purchased or donated, often after a long process of negotiating and bargaining.

Equally, a large part of these funds came from the work of the Provincial Commissions of Historical and Artistic Monuments established in 1844 to coincide with the sale of Church lands and property. They collaborated with the commissions sent by

the Museum to gather and classify the objects from the religious orders. We do not know enough about the work of these commissions but it was certainly not easy work as is clear from what happened to the Governor of Burgos. When he visited Burgos cathedral in 1869, accompanied by a member of the Museum staff, to select exhibits for the state museum, he was greeted by a mob shouting *Long live Religión*. They put a rope around his neck and dragged him "in Christian fashion" down the steps until he was dead.

A. Chastel has emphasised that the Church's resistance to the removal of their most precious consecrated objects was also linked to the general public's indifference to a heritage which was supposed to be national and common to all but which lacked the social esteem which the State tried to give it. "Manifestations of public appreciation of holy sanctuaries, relics, statues or local treasures does not extend to buildings, to the value of the works themselves"^{xi}. In fact these people, whose consecrated memory these museums hopes to represent hardly ever manifests a desire to protect its heritage but on the contrary is more inclined to want to destroy it, as the manifestation of a traditional order which in moments of crisis tries to be completely eliminated.

The references which, in the works of scholars, mention the indifference of the people, their lack of culture, their ignorance in matters relating to the conservation of their heritage should therefore be regarded from the point of view of the enormous paradox contained within them: the fact that the nationalist, political discourse which justifies this meritorious labour of conservation is in no way a spontaneous manifestation of popular sentiment coming from the people but an ideological construction which has today fully triumphed and which, for that same reason, we consider obvious.

Within this ideological construction the museums and, in general, the elements which make up the so-called "national heritage" have become ambits which house relics which, for one reason or another, have a certain value or a certain social significance. As such, since last century they have acquired increasing value. R.Hughes, an acclaimed art critic, argues that museums substituted churches as sources of public pride in Western society. Museums did not only present their exhibits,

they also represented the importance these exhibits warranted. While they were entrusted with the safe-keeping of objects which were profoundly significant to a certain sector of the population, they were the dedicated custodians of the values which this community claimed to represent^{xii}.

The ideological articulation of these values, however is not something which emerges spontaneously, it is not something which is explicit in the exhibited pieces: this ideological articulation needs a discourse and this discourse is fundamentally political. As such, it has no single, undeniable expression; it can be the object of wide controversy if the premises on which it is based are not wholly shared. So in the creation of a collective memory linked to the idea of nation and supported by the State, Spain was no exception. Asymmetry emerged In nearly all the nation-states of 19th century Europe because in some cases it was cultural nationalism that came first and was the force behind political nationalism, as was the case in Germany. In others it was state nationalism that was the driving force behind the cultural assimilation of national homogenisation through acculturation, as was the case of France.

For this reason, instead of constructing the history of Spanish nationalism from the accounts of a few writers and politicians who had something to say about Spain's reality, one should study it as part of the State's endeavours to create a national identity for itself and as an expression of economic interests which aimed quite openly to unify the multiple aspects of the economy, while still allowing different cultural loyalties to survive. This could well have been the case of the Catalan bourgeoisie, for example.^{xiii} We should therefore analyse the political drive of Spanish nationalism from the Cadiz Courts until the "glorious revolution" of 1868, to the cry of "*Spain with honour*" as part of the process of the creation of the nation-state's middle class and of its social and economic position, (above all in the Spanish market). It was, of course, a process that was not incompatible in those decades with sectorial organisations nor with local or regional loyalties. These survived and were transformed by the economic revolution brought about by a capitalism that can, in no way only be identified with industrialism.

2.- The ritualization of the State

If the political and social order of class and feudal privileges of previous centuries,^{xiv} was broken up and revolutionised under the aegis of the nation's sovereignty, if this new nation preached and declared its sovereignty and established laws and regulations^{xv}, then logically and coherently, this nation, that is Spain, became the object or purpose towards which the actions of its component parts were to be directed and thereby make it the personal property of all citizens. "Love of the Fatherland" was therefore declared to be a fundamental obligation (as stated in the same article 2 of the 1812 Cadiz Constitution) and from then onwards there was a constant appeal on behalf of the fatherland to mobilise resources, ideas, make wars or to decree the nationalisation of property and introduce customs duties, for example.

It is worth mentioning at this point how the value of symbolic language acquired new importance in this process. It was not enough just to promote in the public memory the heroic deeds, national heroes, works of art which would inspire patriotic feeling, it was also necessary to reformulate certain historical circumstances from a perspective which was both as Spanish and as national as it was Catholic and monarchist. In fact, the transference from fact to symbols in order to forge public opinion was made evident in the commemorations of the nation's major historical events. A description of the most significant of these commemorations is sufficient to demonstrate the direction taken by Spanish nationalism from the end of the 19th century.

The first major historical centenary was celebrated in 1881. The motive was provided by a literary figure of the Spanish Golden Age, that of the playwright Pedro Calderón de la Barca (1600-1681), whose work had become popular, since the end of the 18th century, with the German Romantics who had laid the foundations of the essence of nationalism. Compared to modern, lay playwrights, such as Shakespeare and Molière, Calderón represented the expression of the "Spanish soul", a nation whose essence was defined precisely by a militant Catholicism. This was a quality which, in 1881, some of the liberals organising the event considered to be a limitation, while for the conservatives it was its most important cultural merit. It was however a centenary attended by almost the whole of the intelligentsia, who, despite their different

political adherences, were unanimous in their adherence to Spain and to cultural nationalism. The most spectacular part of the celebrations was the public procession from Madrid town hall, in the hands of the liberals, with a special gathering of a commission of journalists with representatives from the major newspapers ranging from the conservative *La Epoca* to the republican *El Liberal* and including *El Imparcial*, the highest participation in this event coming from intellectuals linked to the last two papers. Floats from a wide range of institutions and associations paraded along the six kilometres of streets during the grandiose commemorative event. At the head of the parade were the actors, preceded by the music of a battalion and prior to this there were twenty-five horses of the Guardia Civil all greeted with “applause and joyful cheering”. There were floats representing the different trades, citizens organisations and public institutions, ranging from the blacksmiths and locksmiths guild, the Society of Mutual Aid for artists, the Promotion of the Arts (with a press as its emblem), masons, teachers, the Merchants’ Union, the press floats, cultural associations, the army, city and town councils such as Zalamea, Toledo and Granada, whose councillors were preceded by “handsome pages bearing the shield of the Catholic Kings and a herald bearing the glorious Christian ensign placed by the Count of Tendilla in the *Vela* Tower “. Ending the procession were the floats of Spain and the city council. Of course the whole retinue was escorted by hussars as well as by Civil Guards who guaranteed the “smooth advance of the procession” through the streets. It was an “event the likes of which had never been seen before” in the history of “solemn celebrations”, a “noble manifestation of national fervour” which hoped to “leave an indelible mark on the ardent imaginations of youth and infants...[associating] them with the veneration of the glories of the fatherland”^{xvi}.

This homage was not just honouring the playwright’s genius but was also a homage to the nation. It was designed to “draw the attention of other nations “ according to the official newspaper of conservative liberalism- to an event in the organisation of which we have imitated nobody and indeed perhaps the foreigners who have honoured us with their presence on this solemn occasion may have a fair amount to learn from our original and inventive character”^{xvii}. It was a nationalism which suffered from evident complexes before other nations, despite these proclamations of creative originality. It also covered matters which were seemingly trivial but which had huge popular impact, such as declaring that the food offered by journalists to the

foreign press invited to the event was “a typically Spanish lunch, which included the national Valencian paella” The wines were of course also national and led to the comment that “when tasted by the foreigners all were of the just opinion that this nation has rightly been called *the wine cellar of Europe*”^{xviii}. Agreement was not, however, unanimous. There were reactionary sectors who were of the opinion that the Catholic nature of Calderón had not been sufficiently highlighted.^{xix} These were no doubt minority forces but were influential ideologically and intellectually.

There was greater nationalist consensus over the fourth centenary of the discovery of America. According to *La Epoca* the faith and monarchist patriotism of this achievement expressed the destiny of a “chosen people” while for *El Liberal* it signified the superiority of a nation that took progress to the Americans. They all agreed that it was the most significant contribution of a united Spain, strengthened by the Catholic Kings. It was made clear that the aim of the commemoration was to “bear witness to the solidarity of Spain today with the Spain of that time, of the uninterrupted continuity of the life of our fatherland and of our race, that joins us in spirit with the forceful generations of four centuries ago”^{xx}. On this occasion events aimed to reach the international arena. The royal family and the whole government were directly involved . There was also a “public parade” with floats-this time in Huelva- and kings, government and the authorities participated. Newspapers such as *El Liberal* published special editions on October 12th and historians were of course also the protagonists of the Americanist congress, officially closed by Canovas in the presence of the Regent. At the same time, dissidents held a similar event in Madrid- a Congress of Freethinkers presided over by a portrait of Victor Hugo and opened by professor Antonio Machado Núñez, emphasising the dominant character of Spain and the need to establish a republican fraternity with Latin American countries, duly represented by their respective freethinkers^{xxi}.

The congress led to protest from the Catholic reactionaries who called it “profane”. The fourth centenary of the discovery was the perfect occasion to launch a whole battery of arguments that the nationalist reactionary forces had been gathering around the idea of catholicity as synonymous with Spanishness^{xxii}. In the view of the Catholic reactionaries the congress of freethinkers was just as serious a matter as the collusion of the Canovas liberal-conservative government, because the “Spanish

people, led, or rather misled by liberalism- in the words of an officially Catholic newspaper -, see with sorrow and shame how the whores of impiety idly prance around Spain's capital city." But the subsequent complaints of the reactionaries leave us with no doubt as to their true motives; for the people, in whose name the paper claimed to speak "have hardly an inch of land on which to lay their weary members, since all the land of our fatherland is insufficient to bear the fruits seized by the treasury in order to feed the insatiable greed of the liberal State. Heavy is the guilt - concludes the paper- of those who did not want or did not know how to resist the invasion of the liberal corruptor who destroys and dishonours us."^{xxiii}.

At this point in the century, reactionary thought was in direct confrontation with the liberal State over the very Catholicism that this same State proclaimed constitutionally. The reactionaries did not just claim Catholicism as part of the Spanish identity, but by accepting article 11 of the 1876 constitution which established state confessionalism, they were also able to add extra weight to their arguments in the face of governments, and even to the royal family who were publicly and officially practising Catholics. For this reason, during the month of October 1882, the reactionary sectors spread their message exclusively: "the providential mission of the Catholic church and of the Spanish nation in the discovery of the New World" and assembled it into a single ideological concept in such a way as to make freethinking un-Spanish. In response to the freethinkers' congress, they organised a Catholic congress in Seville, with mass included in order to, among other things "commemorate the glories of the Church during the discovery of America."^{xxiv}.

Having reached this level of confrontation and given that for the Catholic traditionalists the Spanish people had been chosen to defend the faith before the world and to carry out the special mission of converting the American people and were now in crisis through the fault of liberal materialism protected by the Cánovas's government of liberal-conservatives, it was necessary to organise their own centenary celebrations under an exclusively Catholic-Spanish banner, separate from the State event. They had already had two opportunities to monopolise the nation's memory, namely the third centenary of the death of Saint Teresa, in October 1882 and when in May 1889 they celebrated the thirteenth centenary of the so-called "Catholic unity" of Spain with the conversión of Recaredo the Gothic king- whom we earlier saw immortalised in the

paintings decorating the Senate halls- in the year 589. If the religious acts commemorating Saint Teresa mostly, once again, exalted the Catholic nature of the Spanish and of their missionary capacities, since Spain was the only “land worthy” of such a saint, and consisted of supplications begging for protection and strength in the defence of “traditional Catholic Spain” and in the “fight against impiety”, the centenary of Recaredo’s conversión aimed to mark the start of a “prompt religious and social regeneration in our fatherland, which has been so weakened today by rationalism, liberalism and naturalism, as it once was by Arianism before pious, magnanimous king Recaredo came to the throne”^{xxv}.

So the inability of liberal historiography to create the idea of a nation clearly distinguishable from the Church or the Crown led to the greatest weakness in the concept of Spain: the representatives of the most reactionary forces argued, not without certain logic, that if the *raison d’etre* of the nation was unity achieved in the name of the Catholic faith, any attack on this faith should be interpreted as an attempt to cast doubt on the nation itself. The Spanish nationalist argument also began to fall apart when different nationalist tendencies began to emerge in other territories and the identification of Castile with Spain was understandably rejected in these ambits. This process was particularly in evidence in the decades preceding and following the turn of the century, when in the name of regenerationism and with the strong political emergence of Catalan nationalism, the hypostasis of Castile with Spain died a death and the union served as a reference to interpret the evolution of Spain as a Nation-state, both in its relations with the rest of the Iberian peninsula and in its role in the international arena.^{xxvi}. So both the arguments of the regional nationalists (Catalans, Basques, Galicians) and the reactions of the defenders of a single, centralist State provoked the cultural and political fracture of Spain as a nation.

One should recall at this point the thoughts of one of the most respected Spanish intellectuals. Ortega y Gasset synthesised convincingly a Castilian-centralism, which was, without doubt a key factor in understanding Spain’s cultural and political collapse. His phrase “Castile made Spain and Castile unmade her” became almost a historiographical and cultural watchword^{xxvii}. But it was not only those who identified with Castilian-centralist, Spanish nationalism who thought this way. An identical message was also sent out from the nationalist tendencies emerging in state politics.

Joan Maragall expressed it with the following words, as forthright as Ortega's: "The Castilian spirit has concluded its mission in Spain -wrote the Catalan intellectual- [it was this that] directed and personified the Renaissance...[then] came the 19th century which promoted the good name of parliamentarianism and its men, they prolonged the mission of shining, sonorous Castile in Spain. But all this is dying and Castile's mission is over. The new civilisation is industrial and Castile is not industrial; the modern spirit is analytical and Castile is not analytical; material progress encourages cosmopolitanism and Castile, situated in the centre of the African plain, with no view of the sea, is resistant to European cosmopolitanism... Castile has concluded its mission and must pass the sceptre on to other hands"^{xxviii}.

There is no need to repeat the thesis which served as our premise, that Spain was created as a nation in the 19th century and that the expedient of history was a decisive factor in the configuration of Spanish nationalism. One could also add that the role given to the Castilian language and literature was equally important. In fact the elimination of linguistic and cultural diversity was as essential to the construction of national homogeneity as the removal of political and social barriers which impeded the free movement of individuals. In this respect, the Castilian language still holds its place as the national language to such an extent that it would take pages to list all the measures introduced by the State in favour of Castilian, while the Catalan, Basque and Galician languages are just as Spanish as Castilian. However, in the 19th century these languages were not taken into account in any way by the State; and still today the most that has been achieved is to keep them confined to the hands of their respective regional governments, as if it were only their responsibility, not the State's nor all of Spain's.

It is only fair to emphasise this asymmetry if we are to understand the situation of cultural coexistence in Spain from the centralisation of the State, initiated by the Bourbons in the 18th century and completed by the liberals in the 19th^{xxix}. It is also an essential piece of information if one is to understand how Spanish nationalism still functions today, despite claims that it has weakened and is incapable of hispanicizing all citizens, as if the only way to achieve this were the cultural expansion of Castilian. In fact, today we can confirm that Spanish nationalism is at its most belligerent in this cultural linguistic aspect. The highest State authorities turn a blind eye to the plurality

recognised in the 1978 Constitution, but regard culture written in Castilian as the only true expression of Spanish culture. The state institutions systematically silence cultural works written in other Spanish languages and focus all their energy on defending Castilian internationally, justified, in their view, by a market of 300 million Spanish-speakers worldwide. At the same time, they hinder and neglect the promotion of the other languages, as if these were the sole responsibility of the corresponding autonomous governments.

3.- Old memories and new problems

In previous pages we have outlined the change which took place in historiographical concepts as a result of the emergence of the nation-state coinciding with the liberal revolution of the 19th century. In the eyes of the liberals, the nation's existence was based on a citizens' agreement or contract. But it was also the culmination of a long historical process which had given the country the special characteristics which form a nation's essence, expression and way of being. Both the liberal Romantics and the traditionalists defended this. The similarity of their ideological viewpoint on this essentialist concept had far-reaching consequences for the organisation of national power and hence for subsequent history and these are still perceptible today to a large extent. Not only was the subject of the narrative changed but the historiographical premises on which the political structure of contemporary Spain is based were established^{xxx}. It was no longer the royal dynasties or the Church but the past of a people in their long pilgrimage towards becoming a nation. So what sort of nation was envisaged? A single Castilian-focused Spain as we have seen above? Or could one also conceive a federal Spain, as proposed by other intellectuals and politicians? Or perhaps the Catholic Spain of traditions and *fueros* was the only possible answer, as the ultra-Catholic traditionalists believed.

In any case, although the historiographical subject changed, the narrative stayed within institutional parameters which responded to the ways in which power relations were organised within the nation-State in the 19th century. So the former narrative of the *Old Regime* that had made the Crown and the Church the pivots of its tale, with romantic liberalism and with the liberal nation's confessional State was now replaced by one which represented erudition and the latest historiographical methodology. As a

result, if, on the one hand, the action of the State laid the foundations of national history as part of the collective memory, on the other, the particular features of that State and the difficult integration of some of its elements brought about a series of contradictions which wore away the foundations of the nationalist conception of Spain's history. These contradictions became more and more obvious as other nationalist tendencies (especially the Catalan, Basque and Galician) began to generate their own interpretations of the past.

Almost two centuries have passed and there have been major ups and downs in the history of the State which governs Spain as a nation. This is not the place to analyse each of these moments in order to evaluate and understand the legacy left today. The fact of the matter is, that at the beginning of the 21st century the nationalist conceptions hatched in the 19th century still prevail today, both in the case of centralist Spanish nationalism and regional nationalism. In this respect, we should also mention the current debate about what has been called "constitutional patriotism" since it includes everything from neo-Spanish centralism to different federalisms^{xxxix}, with history and the past serving as reference points to provide arguments in favour of the respective positions. If Spanish nationalism insists on presenting itself as non-nationalist, as an unquestionable historical reality which comprise others, although in practice ignores plurality, regional nationalism will oppose it by also resorting to history to consolidate former identities or even, in the new Autonomous Communities, established by the 1978 Constitution, to discover ancestral origins previously forgotten. Hence, today from Murcia to Extremadura, from La Rioja and Cantabria to Castilla-La Mancha ancient customs and local idiosyncrasies are used, to justify a radically new political structure, arising from the sovereign will of the 1978 Constitution.

The problems posed by this new situation are evident from a recent debate in education over the content of the school syllabus. Similar debates have been going on in different European countries in recent years. The new educational trends, which were implemented in schools during the eighties and the nineties, have met with considerable criticism by defenders of the old methods of teaching and by concerned parents who realize that their children are not receiving the same kind of knowledge they acquired in their schooldays. In the opinion of these critics, the current system has granted universal access to education but today's children and youngsters just don't know what they are

supposed to learn. From time to time columnists and academics have echoed these concerns in the media complaining about the supposed deficiencies and declining standards in the teaching of Humanities. Defenders of the new methods of teaching have argued that in the cultural revolution of the information era the important thing is not so much to commit factual data to memory, as to master the retrieval tools necessary to find these data. The traditional idea of knowledge as the capacity of keeping in mind a considerable amount of more or less relevant information was suitable in the age before computers, but it is not particularly useful in today's society, which has a cultural potentiality that we do not even suspect^{xxxii}.

Spain has also witnessed a debate on the changing character of the teaching of Humanities, but here it took a peculiar twist. Analysts were not particularly concerned with educational issues, but rather with the impact of historical discourses of emergent nationalist claims and their projection into education. In order to understand this it should be remembered that the current bill on education –which was issued in 1990- gave the central government the capacity of establishing the minimum educational requirements which have to be common for all the students throughout the state; however, the autonomies were empowered to regulate a considerable part of the syllabus: up to 45% in the autonomies with their own language (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) and 35% in the rest of them. The idea was that the educational system must fit into the constitutional framework of the state, which is based on the existence of the above-mentioned autonomies.

This arrangement has particularly affected the teaching of Humanities. The different communities have made use of their attributions in the regulation of the syllabus and have stressed the study on local history, geography or literature, on the peculiarities, which justify the *raison d'être* of a given autonomy. The pedagogic rationale behind this stress on localism is that students can get a better understanding of the abstract issues addressed by Humanities if they are able to apply them to their own environment.

With all this in mind, it is easy to understand that widespread failure to provide right answers to simple historical questions becomes in Spain a major political issue and not like in other European countries a matter of educational concern. It is not perceived as a sign of declining or changing educational standards, but rather as a token that something

is going wrong with the political articulation of the country. The idea is that if future citizens do not recognize the landmarks of Spanish history, the common references of the nation's past, they will feel no attachment to the state. Instead local perspectives, deemed as narrow-minded and parochial, have replaced these common references and for some analysts this is a clear indication of the irreversible breakdown of Spain's unity.

From the beginning the debate took this political orientation. Articles in the media were dedicated to compare school texts from different autonomies showing the different perspective or stress they lay upon the same historical events. The word "falsehoods" was widely used to refer to the interpretations of history, which these school texts contended. Basque and Catalan nationalists were singled out as inventors of traditions, of a mythical past, whose learning they were trying to encourage in the younger generations as part of a calculated and long-term political strategy aiming at the achievement of independence from the central government. These arguments were actively taken up by the ruling conservative party, who thought that the regional education authorities were deliberately underplaying the concept of Spain.

The debate was polemical but failed to produce fresh pluralist perspectives. Central government has resolved the matter with a decree which more or less imposes a nationalist view which is not the only one nor the broadest, though they have not been able to break the constitutional framework and regional governments maintain a quota of history in the syllabus which cannot be taken away. There is no space here to describe all the aspects involved in this political and historiographic debate, in which both political forces and the highest academic authorities have participated^{xxxiii}. The fact is that in Spain today there is clearly a battle to use history in the school curriculum, be it to form *Spaniards* or to form *Basques, Canary Islanders, Galicians...* and in this battle Spanish nationalism is on the offensive.

The persisting framework of nationalist references in a discipline such as history, which presumes to have undergone significant advances both in methodology and in content during the last century, is a complex matter. In order to explain it one has to take into account a certain number of factors. The first of these derives from the very nature of the historical narrative, a narrative necessarily based on the selection of events. This narrative fits perfectly with the premises of a nationalist discourse which

operates with a selective logic regarding the past. Thus it selects those events in the nation's historical evolution which create emotional sentiment with regard to its history, which must never be perceived as something distant or neutral but closely linked to the present. The aim is to construct a narrative in which people are the protagonists, emphasising the differences between the people of this nation and others. This narrative transmits a dual message: on the one hand, it is a declaration that the people of the nation have existed in the past and still exist in the present and, on the other, that deriving from this, there is a legacy from the past, a legacy which demands a commitment to carrying out a future plan. Legacy, commitment, political plan are the three basic premises of nationalist ideologies and constitute the message which is always implicit in the historical narrative which supports them.

The political dimension that the shaping of a historical memory acquires always demands that those responsible for shaping this memory, that is to say, professional historians, adopt some sort of stance. It is to them we turn when we need someone to sanction nationalist claims of one kind or another. Generally isolated in their limited specialised areas, these historians perceive that their work is subjected to intense political and social scrutiny in such a way that it becomes a matter of political controversy between the various parties in confrontation with each other over national claims of whatever ilk. Professional historians do not feel particularly comfortable in this situation. They prefer to see themselves as "experts", as the impartial seekers of historical truth with no agenda or political objectives. In fact, although not explicit decoding the tacit or unconscious nationalisms which circulate via osmosis through the most rigorous and respected works of our profession is bothersome to them^{xxxiv}.

In short, nationalism changes all the rules. It demands from historians the confirmation or rejection of a nation's existence based on the past and as such does not permit impartiality. The problem obviously resides in the fact that historical facts are not so evident as one would hope, that opposing views of an event represent different interpretations and there is always a line of argument which is more or less convincing to support or deny nationalist claims. When there is a confrontation between opposing nationalist tendencies, as in Spain today, each side can always bring in "experts" to support their claim. This gives rise to complex relations with the governing powers which not many historians are ready to recognise but which, like it or not, exert a good

deal of pressure on their work. Whether these pressures are accepted or not, they have an influence but this is not the place to examine this more closely ^{xxxv}.

In any case, the sources of power within a society are not only located in the control of the State but also in other areas of social relations, for example in the capacity to deploy mechanisms of ideological legitimation. Without doubt, the State holds the majority of these mechanisms but not all of them. The case of Spain is a good example in this respect because these mechanisms have not only been in the hands of the State. The tools of the symbolic reconstruction of the socialization processes of a historical memory have been shared in Spain between the State and other leading groups since the 19th century. In fact, nor, in the case of Spain, was control of resources exclusive to the State. For although the Cadiz Constitution established national sovereignty as a means of controlling property, production and political activity (the reason for the birth of the nation-State with Spanish liberalism) , subsequent development , however, reversed the relation. The State was restricted to supporting the interests of the property-owning classes protected by public institutions.

In fact, the cultural control fitting for this modern State, which would have supposed the creation of a single historical memory, of a single cultural, linguistic and artistic tradition and a single patriotism for all the people of the country, was, in Spain, an irregular process of little dynamism and fragmented between different leading groups. It is true that the State controlled the formula which can be catalogued in a schematic way as centralist and Castilian-centred, particularly through the education system with the imposition of Castilian as the only national language, with the formation of a historical memory based on one subject and around museums, artistic heritage and a culture defined by the Romantics as distinctly Spanish. It is true that the people of the State inaugurated by the liberals began to emerge as national Spanish people, less heterogeneous, with better communications, above all through commercial networks and political and military relations, with elections , call-up and public order. This was a process which, once started, continued to unfold due to the advantages of sharing the same language and a collective memory. There was even a attempt to create an identity by exalting the heroes of May 2nd 1808 and rejecting the French.

However, there was an internal dynamic operating which was unlike that of other countries. In 19th century Spain, at the same time as these processes were unfolding from the State, other rival processes were also emerging with a pluralist outlook as far as culture and a federal outlook as far as political matters. The liberal State established itself in Spain on the legacy of peoples whose rulers promoted a different cultural memory and who were strong enough to demand their own power quotas. The result was therefore plural: from the 19th century various historical memories have been constructed in Spain, one belonging to the State and Castilian-focused with claims to hegemony and the others as alternative popular, national identities. In all cases, both for the State and for the Autonomies, teleology has been the dominant method of historiographical explanation. For both Spain and for Catalonia, Andalusia, Cantabria and all the Autonomous Communities, the same myth-producing means has been used to convert history into a tale of moral success so that those who defended or brought the very essence of each national or regional collective automatically became the favourite agents of the respective historiography. However, to decipher the construction of the various national memories, one would have to reconstruct the process of articulation of social classes and economic interests, political power and social exclusion in such a way as to explain the corresponding sociological supports of one memory or another, and even to enable us to rescue from oblivion those memories which hardly had the chance to express themselves. To choose a concrete example, what was the opinion regarding the Spanish nation or Catalan or Andalusian identity of those mothers who for decades rebelled against the system of conscription or who, with their hungry children in their arms, periodically raided the cities' bakeries.

The fact is that we have attributed to Spain or to the respective autonomous region the quality of objects which must be intrinsically homogeneous and must therefore have different boundaries and qualities. We have created models of reality and made such political divisions into something unquestionable and have thus constructed the past as fixed, compact entities. Collective memory of this type can block or short-circuit the possibilities of cultural encounters and the understanding of historical processes as something in permanent flow and transformation, something that is not only decisive for the internal relationship of Spain and its Regional Autonomies but also for understanding the history of the whole in relation to other societies and cultures. That is why, when the map of Spain today is shown globally and in the Regions it should be compulsory to

explain that they may have different boundaries and that each current political entity grew out of different parts and processes, from chance to the easily analysable conflicts of interests, from the internal divisions of the ruling classes and the external impositions of other stronger countries. The collective memory cannot create blind spots and to avoid turning today's borders into dogmas it is only fair to remember that they have all been and are still today, in a state of flux.

Of course today the boundaries cannot be justified as divine providence but at times in many texts or proposals it appears that provident destiny is behind the national or autonomous reality just to ensure that they can be governed by their current political leaders. This can apply to Spain or to each of the Autonomous Regions because in either case almost divine premises are in operation and the borders appear as the fossils of an irremovable historical reality or even expansionist as in the case of *Euskal Herria*. It is therefore historical memory that endorses a map and territorial divisions which, can certainly not be described as indivisible neither for Spain nor for the Regions, whatever the Constitution or the Regional Statutes say. It was wars, conflicts, feudal legacies that defined the forever-changing borders which each political entity -State or Regional- now presents as held together by teleological criteria up until the present. What is more, in the case of Spain, teleology almost makes teleology, because its development often appears in the textbooks as the expansion of a Christian settlement extending its language and culture from the meseta throughout the globe.

So, due to a failure to define it, Spanish nationalism has been confused with the history of Spain, since the times of the Cadiz Courts. It is difficult to distinguish it from the general political history where the concept of Spain is based on the unquestionable assumption that the State is one single entity, which is itself the diminished legacy of a monarchy whose many possessions once scattered the globe. Its vaguely-defined, ever-changing borders are also the result of chance however much we map them as immutable since prehistoric times. This is an anachronism which is endlessly repeated in all the books and is so clearly ideological and sectarian spreading myths instead of knowledge, that it should be urgently banished. Today the political reality is that we are still debating the concept of Spain and since the 19th

century until today historians have played an important part in this process by contributing arguments in one direction or another. We now have, for example, some of the most recent, prestigious syntheses of the history of Spain with a new focus, that of the *normalisation* of Spain's past within the European context.^{xxxvi} And so after decades of emphasising how "Spain is different", today, with more accurate scientific and historiographical reasoning, we are highlighting the similarities with the rest of Europe in order to normalise the present, which is undoubtedly conditioned by Spain's political and economic integration into the European Union from 1986.

Contrary to habitual reasoning which, especially in the case of the 1898 regenerationist literature, resorted to purist explanations or emphasised the particular nature of the Spanish character, today a different historical memory is being constructed which seeks to explain the history of Spain by a comparison with Europe. However, such an approach is from the perspective of such a recently-created Europe that it raises many questions and leaves much to be defined and made explicit. First of all, if this European model which looks towards the past is based on the French, German or Polish model or whether Western Europe excludes Tsarist, orthodox Russia or if the agrarian, Christian Mediterranean can be understood without the Muslim Mediterranean.... To judge by the tone of most of these works they take for granted that Europe is only the Europe of triumphant capitalism in places like Manchester or Renania. But Spain's pace was always several steps behind.

In any case, in the most recently-published books on the general history of Spain, such as those mentioned here, there is still the persisting, underlying, unresolved debate about the link between the State and nationalism promoted by this same State. And this problem becomes even more complex when the State is confused with the monarchy in order to date it back to Visigothic times^{xxxvii}. In short, Spain is a nation which was formed as a result of the expansive trends which drove the Nation-State created in the Cadiz Courts to establish itself as the only significant national entity. Its historical development should not only be analysed through an analysis of ideas but rather through unravelling the different interests involved in such a sovereign concept and in that Spain which, above all, was created fundamentally, from the start as a "home market for the sale of church lands". Hence, what looks conceptually like the fluctuations, weaknesses or breakdown of Spanish nationalism -

from the 19th century- should be analysed from a different point of view and with different content. We should look at the economic and social aspects at play, analyse the origins of the ruling elite and the identities which persisted for two centuries of the single State's existence among broad sectors placed on the side-lines or opposed to the idea of the Spanish nation from a perplexing situation of semi-integration.

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ⁱ On the character of nationalisms and their articulation from the states, as part of the general process of the expansion of capitalism see these classical works, Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and nationalism since 1780 : programme, myth, reality*, (Cambridge, 1990); Anthony Smith, *Theories of nationalism*, (New York, 1971); Ernest Gellner, *Cultura, identidad y política: el nacionalismo y los nuevos cambios sociales*, Barcelona, Gedisa, 1989; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, (London, 1983); M. Hroch, *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe*, (Cambridge, 1985); John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the state*, (New York, 1992); G. Delannoi y P. A. Taguieff, eds., *Théories du nationalisme*, (Paris, 1991); Carlos Forcadell, ed., *Nacionalismo e historia*, (Zaragoza, 1998); Montserrat Guibernau, dir., *Nacionalisme. Debats i dilemes per a un nou mil.lenni*, (Barcelona, 2000); y “El nacionalismo en tiempos de globalización”, *New Left Review*, núm. 1, (2000).

ⁱⁱ Constitution of 1812, art. 1

ⁱⁱⁱ J. Sisinio Pérez Garzón, “La nación, sujeto y objeto del Estado liberal español”, *Historia Contemporánea*, nº 17 (1998), 119-138.

^{iv} Francesc Andreu Martínez Gallego, “Entre el himno de Riego y la marcha real: la nación en el proceso revolucionario español”, en Manuel Chust, ed., *Revoluciones y revolucionarios en el mundo hispano*, (Castelló de la Plana, 2000), 115-172.

^v A useful survey of recent research on this topic in *Historia Social*, nº 40 (2001).

^{vi} An analysis of connections between private interests and public reasons in José A. Piqueras Arenas, “Negocios y política en el siglo XIX español”, in J. Paniagua y J. A. Piqueras, eds., *Poder económico y poder político*, (Valencia, 1998), 11-52.

^{vii} C. Reyero, *La escultura conmemorativa en España. La Edad de Oro del monumento público, 1820-1914*, (Madrid, 1999), 393

^{viii} . Reyero, “Los temas históricos en la pintura española del siglo XIX”, in *La Pintura de Historia del siglo XIX en España*, Madrid, 1992, 50.

^{ix} On the role of history but also of geography see: J. L. Peset, S. Garma, J. S. Pérez Garzón, *Ciencias y enseñanza en la revolución burguesa*, (Madrid, 1978); A. VIÑAO FRAGO, *Política y educación en los orígenes de la España Contemporánea*, (Madrid, 1982); Horacio Capel et al., *Ciencia para la burguesía. Renovación pedagógica y enseñanza de la geografía en la revolución liberal española, 1814-1857*, (Barcelona, 1983); Angels Martínez Bonafé, *Ensenyament, burgesia i liberalisme*, (Valencia, 1983); J. García Puchol, *Los textos escolares de Historia en la enseñanza española: 1808-1900. Análisis de su estructura y contenido*, (Barcelona, 1993); H. Capel et al, *Geografía para todos. La geografía en la enseñanza española durante la segunda mitad del s. XIX*, (Barcelona, 1985); and more recently R. Cuesta Fernández, *Sociogénesis de una disciplina escolar: la Historia*, (Barcelona, 1997); R. López Facal, *O concepto de nación no ensino da historia*, Tese de Doutoramento, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 1999. Carolyn P. Boyd, *Historia Patria. Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875-1975*, (Princeton, 1997).

^x A. Marcos Pous, "Origen y desarrollo del Museo Arqueológico Nacional" en *De Gabinete a Museo Tres siglos de historia del Museo Arqueológico Nacional*, (Madrid, 1983), 26-27. C. González Sánchez, "La primera inauguración del Museo Arqueológico Nacional", in *De Gabinete a Museo...*, 126.

^{xi} Anndré Chastel, " La notion de patrimoine", in Pierre Nora ed., *Les lieux de mémoire*, (Paris, 1997), vol. I, págs. 1433-1469.

^{xii} Robert Hughes, *The Shock of the New*, 2nd, (London, 1991)

^{xiii} The catalan case should be explained bearing in mind other elements, which have been discussed in recent contributions, see Pere Anguera, *Els precedents del catalanisme. Catalanitat i anticentralisme: 1808-1868*, (Barcelona, 2000); Borja de Riquer i Permanyer, *Identitats contemporànies: Catalunya i Espanya*, (Vic, 2000).

^{xiv} This rupture has its roots in the monarchy of 18th century as shown by Antonio Morales Moya, "El Estado de la Ilustración", in G. Gortázar, ed., *Nación y Estado en la España liberal*, (Madrid, 1994), 15-75.

^{xv} J. Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, *La teoría del Estado en los orígenes del constitucionalismo hispánico*, (Madrid, 1983.)

^{xvi} See the details which were described in *La Época*, 25 of May, 1881, and *El Imparcial*, *La Iberia*, *El Liberal*, *El Siglo Futuro* y *El Progreso*, with the same date.

^{xvii} *La Época*, 25 de mayo de 1881

^{xviii} *Ibidem*.

^{xix} The homage had foreign guests, Menéndez Pelayo threw his traditionalist slogans with a provocative intention: "A toast for the catholic faith which is the sustantive, the essence, and the greater and more beautiful of our theology, of our philosophy, of our literature and our art, (...) a toast for the Spanish nation, amazon of the latin race, of which it was shield and barrier against the Germanic basrbarism" in *La Cruz*, I, 1881.

^{xx} This is a literal quote of *La Época*, 12th October, 1892, but there are others similar in the rest of the press.

^{xxi} *El Liberal*, 13th October, 1892

^{xxii} *El Siglo Futuro*, 13th October, 1892

^{xxiii} *Ibid.*

^{xxiv} The information corresponds to days 17th to 21st October in *El Siglo Futuro*.

^{xxv} That was the manifiesto launched by the Juventud Católica from Vitoria, as mentioned in *El Siglo Futuro*, 4th May 1889.

^{xxvi} A thoughtful analysis on this question in Julio Carabaña, "De Castilla como nación, región y desolado paisaje", *Negaciones*, 4 (1978), 97-136

^{xxvii} José Ortega y Gasset, *España invertebrada. Bosquejo de algunos pensamientos históricos*, (Madrid, 1998), 48.

^{xxviii} It was published in *La Lectura*, 1902.

^{xxix} José Luis de la Granja, Justo Beramendi y Pere Anguera, *La España de los nacionalismos y las autonomías*, (Madrid, 2001.)

^{xxx} See above for references on the teaching of history. See also J. S. Pérez Garzón, E. Manzano, R. López Facal y A. Riviere, *La gestión de la memoria. La historia de España al servicio del poder*, (Barcelona, 2000.)

^{xxxi} This is not the place to discuss in detail these issues, but it is necessary to mention that in Spain these days the two main political parties (the conservative Partido Popular and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español) are producing a considerable amount of literature on the topic of “constitutional patriotism” and on how Spain should be organised in order to deal with identities and histories of different peoples.

^{xxxii} See, J. Sutherland, “Do these results matter?”, in *The Guardian*, 28th, October, 2000

^{xxxiii} It should be mentioned here the publication of a collective work by the Real Academia de la Historia in which members of this institution decided that the occasion was ripe to put into practice one of the aims of the Academy included in its founding statutes written back in 1738: “to clarify the important truth of the events, dismissing the fables created by ignorance or malice”; see, *España. Reflexiones sobre el ser de España*, Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, 1997. See a criticism to this volume in J. S. Pérez Garzón en EL PAÍS, 9 de diciembre de 1998. See also, José M^a Ortiz de Orruño, ed., *Historia y sistema educativo*, *Ayer*, nº 30 (1998).

^{xxxiv} Eduarzo Manzano, “Nacionalismo e Historia” in J. Sisinio Pérez Garzón, *La gestión de la memoria....*32-62

^{xxxv} This analysis has been carried out in a number of recent works, see: J. Sisinio Pérez Garzón, “Sobre manuales de historia de España”, *En Teoría*, nº 6 (1981), 41-59; “El debate nacional en España: ataduras y ataderos del romanticismo medievalizante”, *Ayer*, nº 36 (1999), 159-175; y “Los mitos fundacionales y el tiempo de la unidad imaginada del nacionalismo español”, *Historia Social*, nº 40 (2001), 7-27.

^{xxxvi} This historiographic trend has been developed in works on economic history like those by Gabriel Tortella, *El desarrollo de la España contemporánea. Historia económica de los siglos XIX y XX*, (Madrid, 1994); David R. Ringrose, *España, 1700-1900; el mito del fracaso*, Madrid, Alianza, 1996; J.P. Fusi y J. Palafox, *España, 1808-1996. El desafío de la modernidad*, (Madrid, 1997); y J.L. García Delgado y J.C. Jiménez, *Un siglo de España. La economía*, (Madrid-Barcelona 1999); and Gonzalo ANES, coord., *Historia económica de España. Siglos XIX y XX*, (Barcelona, 1999). A survey of this revisionist approach in Santos Juliá, “Anomalía, dolor y fracaso de España”, en *Claves de Razón práctica*, nº 66, octubre de 1996; and Carlos Dardé Morales, *La idea de España en la historiografía del siglo XX*, (Santander, 1999.)

^{xxxvii} See, for instance, Joseph Perez, *Historia de España*, (Barcelona, 1998), and Miguel Artola, *La Monarquía de España*, (Madrid, 1999).